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The Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, through counsel, replies to respondents' 
briefs as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AIR QUALITY BOARD ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DIVISION OF 
AIR QUALITY'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER CO? AND OTHER 
GREENHOUSE GASES, 
Carbon dioxide must be included in BACT analysis under the applicable Utah 
regulation, and because greenhouse gases, including C02? are subject to regulation. 
A. AQB Plainly Erred in Failing to Apply the Correct BACT Regulation When 
Considering Greenhouse Gases. 
The Utah Air Quality Board ("AQB" or "Board") erred when, in 2007, it relied 
upon the pre-2007 Best Available Control Technology ("BACT") regulation that required 
reduction of "each pollutant" rather than the then-current version, which requires 
reduction of "each air contaminant." Compare Utah Admin. Code ("UAC") R307-101-2 
(current through Dec. 2005) with id R307-401-2 (2007). It is the "long-standing 
traditional rule" that evolving legal standards apply to cases on appeal. State v. Saunders, 
1999 UT 59, TJ 53, 992 P.2d 951 (applying new court decision both prospectively and 
retrospectively); State v. Belgard, 615 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1980) (u[A]n appellate 
court must apply the current law rather than the law as it existed at the time the lower 
court acted.") (quoting United States v. Fitzgerald, 545 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1976)). In this 
case, AQB was effectively adjudicating the appeal of the initial appeal of the initial 
approval order ("AO") issued by the Utah Division of Air Quality ("DAQ"). 
This issue is properly raised on appeal under the plain error doctrine: (1) the error 
was plain because, inter alia, the new rule was promulgated by the AQB itself; and (2) 
the error caused harm insofar as the respondents rely on the old rule to avoid any 
obligation to reduce emissions of millions of tons of greenhouse gases over the life of the 
proposed plant. 
No respondent contests that Sierra Club is harmed by the error. Sevier Power 
Company ("SPC") responds only that Sierra Club fails to establish plain error. This 
conclusory statement is unsupported either by legal authority or argument. Compare 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). As such, it is inadequately briefed and the contention "may be 
disregarded or stricken." Utah R. App. P. 24(k). 
AQB concludes - without "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied upon," Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) - that use of the old rule was proper 
because it had a property interest in the initial AO. This claim not only is inadequately 
briefed, it is also wrong. The initial AO did not create vested rights. It never became an 
"effective" or "final" order because it was timely challenged pursuant to UAC R307-103-
3. The initial AO, therefore, constituted a preliminary determination subject to challenge, 
review and modification, not reliance. See UAC R307-103-6 (defining parties permitted 
to intervene precisely for purpose of challenging such preliminary determinations); 40 
C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(6)(iv) (Title V permit, which SPC must obtain to operate, is not property 
right). AQB's conclusory response addresses none of these arguments set forth in Sierra 
Club's opening brief at 20-21. AQB's use of the old rule constituted plain error and 
caused harm. 
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B. AQB Erred Even Under the Old Rule Because Carbon Dioxide 
Is Regulated. 
The old version of Utah's BACT definition upon which the Board relied parallels 
the federal Clean Air Act, requiring BACT for "each pollutant subject to regulation under 
the Clean Air Act and/or the Utah [ACA]." UAC R307-101-2 (2005); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7475(a)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50)(iv). The SPC permit must 
include a BACT emission limit for carbon dioxide because it is a pollutant subject to 
regulation under the Clean Air Act. 
Carbon dioxide has been regulated under the Clean Air Act since 1993, when 
EPA adopted regulations implementing Section 821 that require monitoring, 
recordkeeping and reporting of C02 emissions by certain sources. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k 
note; Pub. L. 101-549; 40 C.F.R. § 75.1 et seq. On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court 
held that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are "pollutants" under the Clean Air 
Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, - U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007). Now having been 
definitively ruled a pollutant, C02 is accordingly a regulated pollutant under the Act, 
and the PSD permit must include a C02 BACT emission limit. 
1. This argument was preserved. 
Sierra Club's opening brief, at 22-24, establishes that C02 is indeed "regulated," 
and thus was "subject to regulation" by AQB even under the old rule. SPC claims Sierra 
Club did not preserve for appeal the argument that C02 monitoring and reporting 
regulations constitute regulation. 
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This issue was clearly preserved in the Sierra Club's Consolidated Opposition To 
Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings, SPC 2866-2981, where Sierra Club stated that 
"The Supreme Court will issue its ruling [in Massachusetts v. EPA] this spring, and the 
Board should anticipate the possibility of a decision requiring future regulation of 
greenhouse gas pollutants from coal-fired power plants." SPC 2897-98.l In arguing 
that C02 was a pollutant subject to regulation, Sierra Club's opposition memorandum 
declared: 
Further, the Clean Air Act specifically includes carbon dioxide in a list of 
"air pollutants." Section 103(g) [of the CAA] directs EPA to conduct a 
research program concerning "[improvements in nonregulatory strategies 
and technologies for preventing or reducing multiple air pollutants, 
including . .. carbon dioxide, from stationary sources, including fossil fuel 
power plants." The Clean Air Act requires regulation of air pollutants that 
"may reasonably be anticipated to endanger human health or welfare." The 
statutory definition of "welfare" specifically includes effects on climate and 
weather. 
SPC at 2898 (notes omitted). The issue, moreover, was sufficiently presented to permit 
the AQB to rule upon it (albeit erroneously). SPC 4695-96 (rejecting arguments that C02 
was subject to regulation). 
2. CO2 is an air pollutant subject to regulation. 
The first post-Massachusetts decision as to whether a BACT analysis is required 
for C02 emissions ruled that it is. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc. v. Longleaf Energy 
1
 On April 3, 2007, Sierra Club submitted its Consolidated Notice of Supplemental Authority, 
informing the Board of the Massachusetts ruling, and asserting: "The Court's determinations is 
important because Sierra Club alleges in its Requests for Agency Action that carbon dioxide and 
nitrous oxide are air pollutants subject to regulation under the Clean air Act and Utah [ACA], 
and must be considered when developing these permits." SPC 3061-62. 
4 
Assoc, Docket No. 2008CV146398, 13-14 (Super. Ct. Ga. June 30, 2008) ("Longleaf").2 
A copy of Longleaf is attached hereto as Addendum A. The Georgia court held "[pjutting 
aside the argument that any substance that falls within the statutory definition of 'air 
pollutant' may be 'subject toj regulation under the Act, there is no question that C02 is 
'subject to regulation under the Act.'" Id, at 6-7. The court relied, inter alia, upon 
precisely the C02 monitoring provisions respondents herein seek to discredit. Id. at 7 
(citing 40 C.F.R. Part 75). 
Intervenor Pacificorp advances the same argument that the Longleaf court 
rejected. It advocates a narrow definition of the term "regulation" that includes only 
those regulations requiring "control" of emissions, by which it means restrictions or 
limits on emissions quantities. Pacificorp Br. 21. Thus Pacificorp contends that C02 is 
not subject to regulation under the CAA because the regulations required by section 821 
do not constitute "regulation" within the meaning of section 165(a)(4) since they do not 
cap C02 emissions. As the Longleaf court recognized, this position is untenable. Id. 
When Congress adopted the PSD provisions of the Clean Air Act in 1977, it 
required a BACT emission limit "for each pollutant subject to regulation under this 
chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). When it amended the Act in 1990, it required EPA to 
"promulgate regulations" requiring monitoring and reporting of C02 emissions. 42 
U.S.C. § 7651k note. Those regulations rendered C02 "subject to regulation" under the 
Act and therefore subject to BACT. Congress used the same word in both provisions, 
2
 On Aug. 20, 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that it would review the 
Longleaf decision. See http://www.gaappeals.us/docket/results_one_record.php7docr__ 
case_num=A08D0472 (Georgia Court of Appeals website indicating appeal granted). 
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and the strong presumption is that the word means the same thing in both instances. 
Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Lundv. 516 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1996). 
Monitoring and reporting requirements clearly constitute regulation. Longleaf at 
7-8; cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (record keeping and reporting 
requirements are regulation of political speech). Carbon dioxide emissions are subject to 
monitoring, so they therefore are subject to regulation. Just like regulations restricting 
emissions quantities, the regulations EPA promulgated implementing Section 821 have 
the force of law, and violation results in severe sanctions. 40 C.F.R. § 75.5; 42 U.S.C. § 
7113(c)(2) (punishable by imprisonment of up to six months or fine of up to $10,000 for 
making false statement or representation or providing inaccurate monitoring reports 
under Clean Air Act); see Longleaf at 7 (monitoring regulations enforceable by criminal 
sanction). Indeed, EPA has enforced section 821 in a number of consent decrees that 
require the installation of C02 monitoring equipment. See Add. B (Excerpt of Exh. 1 to 
EPA Region VIII and Office of Air and Radiation Supplemental Brief, In re Deseret 
Power Electric Cooperative, PSD Appeal No. 07-03, EAB). 
In support of its argument that Congress intended "regulation" to mean only a 
restriction on emissions quantity, Pacificorp notes that Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"regulation" as "[t]he act or process of controlling by rule or restriction." So it does. But 
Congress explicitly used the word "regulation" in Section 821 to refer solely to 
6 
monitoring and reporting requirements. Moreover, "control" is not synonymous with 
"limit" or "restrict."3 
Pacificorp also argues that the phrase "subject to" requires control of emissions. 
Br. 23-24. A pollutant, however, can be "subject to" monitoring just as easily as it can be 
"subject to" emissions limitations: both are forms of regulation. Contrary to Pacificorp's 
contention, the pollutant emissions, not the facilities or sources, are subject to 
monitoring. A regulation affects facilities in the same manner whether it requires 
emissions limitations or emissions monitoring: just as facility operators must install 
equipment to limit emissions, so must they install equipment to monitor emissions. 
a. The Structure of the CAA Favors a Broad Interpretation of "Regulation. " 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court noted that Congress deliberately used broad 
language in the Clean Air Act to render it flexible enough to avoid future obsolescence as 
a result of changing circumstances and scientific developments. — U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. at 
1462. Pacificorp's narrow interpretation of the term "regulation" contravenes the U.S 
Supreme Court's admonition to give full effect to the broad language of the Act.4 
3Black's defines "control" as "the power or authority to manage, direct, or oversee." 
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Monitoring and reporting regulations certainly 
constitute oversight. 
4Pacificorp apparently derived this interpretation from an internal 1993 EPA memo 
justifying a narrow interpretation of "pollutants subject to regulation under the Act" 
based on the mistaken belief that Congress did not intend to regulate C02. See Lydia N. 
Wegman, Definition of Regulated Air Pollutant for Purposes of Title V, Memo to Air 
Division Director, Regions I-X (Apr. 26, 1993), at 4-5. In concluding that C02 was a 
pollutant, however, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected that exact agency rationale, i.e., 
EPA's mistaken belief that Congress did not intend it to regulate greenhouse gases. 
Massachusetts v. EPA, -- U.S. --,127 S.Ct. at 1460. In the wake of Massachusetts, any 
EPA regulatory treatment of C02 based on the rationale that Congress did not intend 
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The Act's PSD provisions apply to a broader range of pollutants than do the Act's 
emissions limits provisions. Pacificorp's arguments miss this fundamental distinction. 
Congress explicitly stated the purpose of the PSD program: to "protect public health and 
welfare from any actual or potential adverse effect which in the Administrator's 
judgment may reasonably be anticipate^] to occur from air pollution . . . , 
notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of all national ambient air quality 
standards." 42 U.S.C § 7470(1) (emphasis added). In contrast, Congress was equally 
explicit in requiring EPA to make an endangerment finding before establishing generally 
applicable standards such as the NAAQS, New Source Performance Standards, or motor 
vehicle emissions standards. Unlike the PSD program, each of these programs expressly 
requires EPA to find that emissions of a pollutant "cause or contribute to air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare" as a 
prerequisite to regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1); see also 
42 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1). 
Thus Congress - which was familiar with the "endangerment trigger" -
deliberately established a much lower threshold for requiring BACT than an 
"endangerment finding." Requiring BACT for "each pollutant subject to regulation 
under the Act" meshes perfectly with the PSD program's purpose to guard against "any . 
regulation of C02 is no longer valid. Nor does the Cannon memo provide support for 
Pacificorp's interpretation. See Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, EPA, EPA's 
Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power Generation Sources, Memo 
to Carol M. Browner (April 10, 1998). While the Cannon memo states that "the 
Administrator has not yet determined that C02 meets the criteria for regulation under one 
or more provision of the Act," id. at 4, it does not speak to whether Congress had made a 
determination to regulate C02. Clearly, Congress has done so by adopting Section 821. 
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. . potential adverse effect," as opposed to endangerment of public health or welfare. 
Pacificorp ignores this distinction in arguing that EPA's failure to make an endangerment 
finding in the context of the motor vehicle emission standards at issue in Massachusetts 
v. EPA means that C02 is not subject to regulation. See Pacificorp Br. 27, 29. No 
endangerment finding is required before BACT can be applied to C02. 
This lower threshold for triggering BACT makes perfect sense, because BACT is 
not a generally applicable standard, but rather involves a case-by-case analysis. 
Requiring BACT analysis does not prejudge the outcome by mandating a particular 
emissions limit. Rather, the Act requires balancing of "energy, environmental, and 
economic impacts and other costs" in the BACT analysis, providing a mechanism for 
implementing the purpose of the PSD program. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). As a result, BACT 
analysis can be applied to emissions that Congress and EPA have not yet otherwise 
elected to restrict, in a manner that is cost-effective, consistent with the limits of available 
technology, and appropriate in light of environmental and energy implications. 
Respondents claim that the BACT process is not suited to address C02 emissions 
because EPA has not yet set limits on greenhouse gas emissions. This argument ignores 
the function of BACT within the PSD program: to achieve the "maximum degree of 
reduction" of air pollutants specifically including C02 that are "achievable" through use 
of available and affordable means. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1990); 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(12); 
UACR307-101-2. 
In fashioning the PSD program, Congress imposed varying PSD requirements 
depending upon the status of the pollutant; all regulated pollutants were controlled to 
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some extent, while those regulated under certain specific provisions of the Act were 
subjected to a more rigorous level of analysis and control. For example, while sections 
165(a)(4) and 165(e)(1) apply to "each pollutant subject to regulation" under the Act, 
section 163 applies only to pollutants subject to maximum allowable increases 
(particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides). 42 U.S.C §§ 7473, 7475. Thus, 
Pacificorp is wrong in arguing that BACT applies only to pollutants with maximum 
allowable increases or maximum allowable concentrations. See Pacificorp Br. 22 n.9.5 
Similarly, Pacificorp erroneously suggests that the reference in section 169(3) to 
new source performance (section 111) and hazardous air pollutant (section 112) standards 
indicates an intent to limit BACT to pollutants subject to emissions controls under some 
other provision of the Act. IdL The language of section 169(3) belies this assertion. The 
first sentence provides a definition of BACT to be applied broadly to "each pollutant 
subject to regulation under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). The second sentence 
ensures that employing the BACT standard defined in the first sentence does not result in 
5BACT clearly applies to sulfuric acid mist, for example, which has no maximum 
allowable increments or concentrations. 67 Fed. Reg. 80186, 80240 (Dec. 31, 2002). 
Pacificorp ignores a similar distinction between sections 165(e)(1) and 165(e)(2) and 
inappropriately conflates those two subsections. See Pacificorp Br. 22 n.9. Section 
165(e)(1) applies broadly, like BACT, requiring an air quality analysis "for each 
pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter which will be emitted from such 
facility." Section 165(e)(2) is more narrow, requiring air quality monitoring only for 
pollutants with maximum allowable increases or maximum allowable concentrations. 42 
U.S.C. § 7475(e). See Alabama Power v. Costle. 636 F.2d 323, 371-72 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(holding that section 165(e)(2) requires monitoring for NAAQS pollutants, but section 
165(e)(1) requires only "analysis" for pollutants subject to regulation under Act). Thus, 
it is perfectly consistent with the statutory structure to subject emissions of various 
pollutants to different PSD requirements. 
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a violation of section 111 or 112 for any pollutants to which those provisions apply, 
including not only the pollutant subject to that BACT analysis, but also any other section 
111 or 112 pollutant. It serves the dual purpose of ensuring that (1) controls for one 
pollutant do not raise emissions of other pollutants above levels allowed by sections 111 
and 112; and (2) the flexibility inherent in the BACT standard does not result in 
emissions levels for any pollutant that violate those other standards. It simply ensures 
consistency among the statutory provisions. Finally, the phrase "any applicable 
standard" implies that no section 111 or 112 standard may apply. LI 
In sum, while certain PSD provisions state that if there is a limit set, then 
emissions may not exceed that limit, they do not link the "maximum . . . achievable" 
degree of reduction to that limit. In other words, the maximum limits merely set the 
ceiling, while BACT requires pollution control to be as far below that ceiling as is readily 
achievable. Where, as here, there is no maximum limit for C02 yet established, the law is 
clear: Do the best you can. 
b. The EPA Regulation Implementing Section 165 Requires BACT for CO^ 
As the Longleaf court noted, interpreting "regulation" to mean limits on the 
quantity of emissions is inconsistent with the EPA's regulatory definition of air pollutants 
that require BACT. Longleaf at 8. The court noted that the EPA defined a "regulated" 
pollutant to include "any pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act." 
Id at 8-9 (quoting 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(50)(iv)). The court declared: 
Limiting BACT determinations to those air pollutants for which there is a 
separate, general numerical limitation effectively ignores part (iv) of the 
regulation that sweeps in all pollutants that are "otherwise subject to 
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regulation under the Act." Since C02 is "otherwise subject to regulation 
under the Act," a PSD permit cannot issue for Longleaf without C02 
emission limitations based on a BACT analysis. 
Id. at 9 (citations omitted). The broad language of EPA's regulation, like the broad 
language of the Clean Air Act, clearly encompasses pollutants that are subject to 
monitoring and reporting regulations. 
Pacificorp points to a list of pollutants in the preamble to the final rule 
promulgating, inter alia, the definition of "regulated NSR pollutant" and argues that this 
list constitutes the entire universe of pollutants subject to regulation under the Act. 
Pacificorp Br. 21 n.8. Yet neither the preamble, nor the rule, nor the original notice of 
proposed rulemaking indicate that this list is intended as a comprehensive and exclusive 
catalogue of pollutants subject to PSD permitting. See 67 Fed. Reg. 80186, 80240 (Dec. 
31, 2002); 61 Fed. Reg. 38250, 38310 (July 23, 1996). The list appears in a section of the 
rulemaking titled "Listed Hazardous Air Pollutants" that addressed which hazardous air 
pollutants would continue to be subject to PSD requirements in light of the 1990 
amendments to section 112. 67 Fed. Reg. at 80240; 61 Fed. Reg. at 38309-11. The list, 
however, excludes PM2.s, a pollutant that most certainly is subject to limits on the 
quantity of emissions. Because PM2.5 is clearly a "regulated NSR pollutant," its absence 
demonstrates that the list is not comprehensive. 
Pacificorp also claims that the preamble to the 1978 PSD regulations somehow 
limits the pollutants that are now subject to regulation under the Act. Pacificorp Br. 22. 
The 1978 preamble, however, merely described the statute as it existed at that time, and 
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in no way limits pollutants that may have subsequently become subject to regulation 
under the Act due to statutory amendments. 
c. A Narrow Reading of "Regulation " Conflicts with D. C Circuit Precedent. 
The D.C. Circuit's holding in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 403 
(D.C. Cir. 1979), foreclosed the narrow reading of the phrase "each pollutant subject to 
regulation" that Pacificorp espouses. In Alabama Power, industry groups challenged 
EPA regulations implementing the newly-enacted PSD provisions, arguing that BACT 
applied only to sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. The court upheld EPA's regulation 
that, as characterized by the court, "applies PSD and BACT immediately to each type of 
pollutant regulated for any purpose under any provision of the Act, not limited to 
sulfur dioxide and particulates." Id (emphasis added). The court declared that the 
phrase "each pollutant subject to regulation" should be read broadly: 
The only administrative task apparently reserved to the Agency . . . 
is to identify those . . . pollutants subject to regulation under the Act which 
are thereby comprehended by the statute. The language of the Act does not 
limit the applicability of PSD only to one or several of the pollutants 
regulated under the A c t . . . . 
Id. at 404. Although this decision predates the enactment of Section 821, the D.C. 
Circuit's reasoning behind its holding that BACT applies "immediately to each 
type of pollutant regulated for any purpose under any provision of the Act," id. at 
403, applies to the subsequent enactment of statutory provisions that subject 
additional pollutants to regulation, such as Section 821. The court's rationale 
compels the conclusion that BACT applies to C02 . 
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The Environmental Appeals Board cases on which Pacificorp relies do not 
contradict the conclusion that C02 is subject to regulation under the Act. In In re 
Inter-Power of New York, Inc., 5 E.A.D. 130 (EAB 1994), the Board's 
perfunctory comment that C02 was an "unregulated pollutant" was correct as 
applied in that case, because petitioners were challenging a permit that had been 
issued before EPA regulated C02 by adopting the section 821 monitoring rules. 5 
E.A.D. at 131; see 58 Fed. Reg. 3701 (Jan. 11, 1993). In In re Kawaihae 
Cogeneration Project, 7 E.A.D. 107 (EAB 1997), petitioners did not argue that 
C02 is regulated under the Act or that the PSD permit should have included a C02 
BACT emission limit, so the Board did not reach the merits of the C02 regulation 
issue. 7 E.A.D. at 132. 
3. CO2 is subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act 
Section 821 is unquestionably part of the Clean Air Act. The monitoring, 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements it imposes are inextricably tied to the 
framework in section 412 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651k. 
Section 821 is an intrinsic and enforceable part of the Clean Air Act. In enacting 
section 821, Congress commanded EPA to promulgate binding regulations requiring all 
Title V sources to "monitor carbon dioxide emissions according to the same timetable as 
in section [412](b) and (c)" and report that data to the Administrator. 42 U.S.C. § 7651k 
note. Congress explicitly made these requirements enforceable under the Clean Air Act 
by mandating that the "prohibition" provisions of section 412(e) "shall apply for the 
purposes of this section in the same manner and to the same extent as such provision 
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applies to the monitoring and data referred to in section [412]." Id. (emphasis added). 
Section 412(e) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for the owner or operator of any source subject to this 
subchapter to operate a source without complying with the requirements of this 
section, and any regulations implementing this section. 
42 U.S.C. § 7651k(e). Congress clearly intended section 821 to be an enforceable part of 
the Act. 
In keeping with that congressional purpose, EPA has consistently treated Section 
821 as a part of the Clean Air Act. The regulations implementing Section 821 explicitly 
state that a[a] violation of any applicable regulation in this par t . . . is a violation of the 
Act." 40 C.F.R. § 75.5(a). The regulations implementing Section 821 are the same 
regulations that implement Section 412 of the Act. They state: 
The purpose of this part is to establish requirements for the monitoring, 
recordkeeping, and reporting of sulfur dioxide (S02), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and 
carbon dioxide (C02) emissions, volumetric flow, and opacity data from affected 
units under the Acid Rain Program pursuant to Sections 412 and 821 of the 
CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q as amended by Public Law 101-549 (November 
15,1990) [the Act]. 
40 C.F.R. § 75.1(a) (emphasis added). The proposed rule noted that it "establishes 
requirements for the monitoring and reporting of C02 emissions pursuant to Section 821 
of the Act." 56 Fed. Reg. 63,002, 63,291 (Dec. 3, 1991) (emphasis added). Subsequent 
rulemaking proceedings referred to these regulations as "the 'core' regulations that 
implemented the major provisions of Title IV of the Clean Air Act (CAA or the Act), 
as amended November 15, 1990, including . . . the CEM regulation at 40 CFR part 75 
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authorized under Sections 412 and 821 of the Act." 60 Fed. Reg. 26,510 (May 17, 
1995) (emphasis added); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 42,509 (Aug. 18, 1994). 
Significantly, EPA has enforced section 821 requirements pursuant to the 
enforcement authority conferred by section 113 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413. See Add. 
B. Moreover, the requirement to monitor C02 is included in Title V permits, which are 
issued under the Clean Air Act. See, e^g., Add. C (Title V Operating Permit No. 
3500068002, at 13, Nov. 29, 2004) (permit issued by DAQ for Pacificorp plant in Salt 
Lake City: "The permittee shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate continuous 
emission monitoring systems (CEMS) for NOx and C0 2 as required by 40 CFR Part 75 
for the Acid Rain Program.") 
Pacificorp erroneously asserts that Section 821 is not part of the Act because it 
was codified as a note, and because a compilation of the Act published by a House 
committee after its enactment implied that Section 821 did not amend the Act. "[T]he 
fact that [a] provision was codified as a statutory note is of no moment." Conyers v. 
Merit Svs. Prot. Bd., 388 F.3d 1380, 1382 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In the specific context of 
the Clean Air Act, the D.C. Circuit unhesitatingly categorized a note to 42 U.S.C. § 7502 
as being "in the Act." New York v. EPA.. 413 F.3d 3, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
added) (reviewing EPA's interpretation of New Source Review permitting process for 
stationary sources under CAA).6 
The characterization of Section 821 in a subsequent House Energy and Commerce 
6Because § 821 is inextricably intertwined with § 412, the lack of an express statement 
within the former that it amends the Act does not undermine the conclusion that is part of 
the Act. 
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Committee publication7 has no bearing on whether Congress intended it to be part of the 
Clean Air Act. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "'the views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.'" 
Massachusetts v. EPA, -- U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. at 1460 n.27 (quoting United States v. Price, 
361 U.S. 304, 313 (I960)). "[P]ost-enactment legislative history is not only oxymoronic 
but inherently entitled to little weight." Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
The law is clear, as are respondents' BACT obligations: A permit for the new 
plant must ensure that C02 and other greenhouse gas emissions are minimized to the 
"maximum .. . achievable" degree possible. Neither the law, nor the State of Utah's 
environment, sanctions any further delay. 
II. DAP ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO CONSIDER IGCC IN THE SPC 
BACT ANALYSIS. 
A. IGCC Must Be Considered Because BACT Requires Consideration of Any 
Technology Allowing the "Emitting Facility" to Emit Less Pollution. 
Each respondent posits that Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle ("IGCC") is a 
power generating technology, not a pollution control technology. This distinction is 
insignificant, because Congress intended BACT to apply to "emitting facilities," and both 
the coal-fired plant proposed by SPC and an IGCC coal-fired plant are within the same 
class of "emitting facilities." See Longleaf, at 13-14 (BACT explicitly requires analysis 
7See House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Compilation of Selected Acts within 
the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 451-52 (Comm. Print, 
2001), available at http://epw.senate.gov/cleanair.pdf. Section 821 appears under the 
heading "Provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Public Law 101-549) 
That Did Not Amend the Clean Air Act." 
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and permit emission limitations based on "emitting facility" as whole); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7479(3). Contrary to respondents' contention, employing IGCC would not redefine the 
scope of the project; it is simply an alternative production process, and must be 
considered under B ACT. 
Four definitions are vital to understanding the error respondents perpetuate in their 
briefs. First, no one disputes that IGCC is a "production process" as that term is used in 
the BACT definition. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3); see also SPC 4670; AQB Br. 22. Second, 
Congress classified together all "fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants" as one discrete 
class of "major emitting facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). Third, this discrete category 
not only includes the coal plant SPC initially proposed, but also coal-fired IGCC plants: 
IGCC electric utility steam generating unit means a coal-fired electric 
utility steam generating unit that burns a synthetic gas derived from coal in 
a combined-cycle gas turbine. No coal is directly burned in the unit during 
operation. 
40 C.F.R. § 60.4IDa; see also id. (conversely, "[c]oal-fired electric utility steam 
generating unit means an electric utility steam generating unit that burns coal, coal refuse, 
or a synthetic gas derived from coal either exclusively, in any combination together, or 
in any combination with other fuels in any amount" (emphasis added)). In other words, 
whether SPC builds a coal-fired plant as initially planned, or a coal-fired IGCC plant, the 
plant would still be within the same "fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants" class of 
"major emitting facilities." 
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Finally, and most significantly, Congress intended BACT analysis to be applied 
not merely to a power generating source, i.e., a boiler or turbine, but rather to the "major 
emitting facility" itself: 
The term "best available control technology" means an emission limitation 
based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to 
regulation under this chapter emitted from or which results from any major 
emitting facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other 
costs, determines is achievable for such facility through application of 
production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, 
including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel 
combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant. 
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (emphasis added). AQB's obligation, therefore, is to require SPC to 
identify production processes by which the proposed major emitting facility will 
maximize pollution control. Requiring analysis of IGCC production process would not 
even require stepping outside the same class of emitting facilities SPC initially proposed. 
See Longleaf at 14 (holding that "[t]he ALJ erred in ruling that IGCC would 'redefine the 
air pollution source' so that it need not be part of the BACT analyses"). 
AQB's so-called factual findings, with which each respondent seeks to accredit the 
AQB's legal conclusion that IGCC need not be considered, are irrelevant because the 
legal conclusion itself is flawed. The findings merely support AQB's erroneous legal 
conclusion that IGCC constitutes a different "source." Because IGCC and SPC's coal 
plant are defined as being in the same category of sources, or emitting facilities, 
interchanging the different processes does not redefine the source. IGCC, in fact, must 
be considered as BACT because it might allow SPC's proposed major emitting source to 
reduce pollution over its 40 to 50 years of operation. 
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Neither respondent has so much as hinted what harm mere consideration would 
impose. If installing IGCC turns out to be unachievable "taking into account energy, 
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs," then at least we are assured that 
the best available control technology really will be used. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). 
B. IGCC Is "Available," 
Each respondent addresses the availability issue by emphasizing its expert's 
testimony. This emphasis is misplaced. The expert testimony is based upon a definition 
of "available" so narrow as to eviscerate the term's meaning as well as the very purpose 
of BACT. "Available" must include those processes that are "potentially" available, 
those that have been used in different industries, and those that have been employed at 
home and abroad. U.S. EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual at B.l 1 (Draft Oct. 
1990) ("NSR Manual") ("Applicants are expected to identify all demonstrated and 
potentially applicable control technology alternatives.") See Add. D. "The term 
available is used in its broadest sense under the first step [of BACT analysis] and refers to 
control options with a 'practical potential for application to the emissions unit' under 
evaluation." In re Knauf Fiberglass, 8 E.A.D. 121, 130 (EAB 1999) (quoting NSR 
Manual). Instead of following the NSR Manual's clear directive, the AQB effectively 
defines "available" as only including that technology already available off the shelf on 
aisle nine at Home Depot. See SPC 4699-701. 
IGCC technology is unquestionably "available" as it has been employed in at least 
four plants designed to use coal, ranging in size from 192 MW to 298 MW, two of which 
are in the United States. See SPC 3558-59 (Profiled Test, of J. Thompson, Aug. 31, 
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2007). Additionally, there currently are at least 130 gasification projects in operation 
worldwide, fourteen of which use IGCC technology. IGCC coal-burning plants have 
successfully operated around the world since 1994, and more and larger plants using 
IGCC are in construction or proposed in Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington and West Virginia. See SPC 3560-61. 
IGCC technology clearly is available, as these projects evidence. 
The fundamental purpose underlying BACT is to compel "rapid adoption of 
improvements in technology as new sources are built." S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 29 (1977); 
SPC 3585-86. This technology-forcing philosophy was "fundamental" to Congress's 
adoption of the BACT requirement and efforts in the 1977 amendments "to accentuate 
technological innovation in the control of air pollutants." Id. at 10. Congress plainly saw 
the goals of the Clean Air Act are best served by requiring BACT analysis for a broad 
range of available technologies. Even if further analysis fails to show that IGCC is 
BACT for SPC, such analysis will identify IGCC's current shortcomings for further 
industry and regulatory innovation. Absent this constant drive for maximum control of 
air pollution, fostered by the BACT process itself, the Act will not achieve the 
technological advancements that Congress envisioned. IGCC therefore should be 
included in the BACT determination for SPC. 
III. THE NITROUS OXIDES BACT DETERMINATION WAS 
UNREASONABLE. 
BACT determinations must be "reasonable" and must be based on statutory and 
regulatory factors. Alaska Dep't of Envt'l. Cons, v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 485, 500-502 
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(2004). Reasonable BACT decisions must be "made with fidelity to the [Clean Air] 
Act's purpose to 'insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the 
preservation of existing clean air resources.'" I d at 485 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3)). 
The purpose of BACT is to achieve "the maximum degree of reduction of each", 
regulated pollutant. UAC R307-101-2 (2005) (emphasis added). BACT should yield 
"the highest air cleaning efficiencies and the lowest pollution discharges." See Add. E 
(Utah State Implementation Plan ("SIP") § VII(D)(2) (2006)). 
DAQ's BACT decision was unreasonable: it was based upon findings of fact that, 
when viewed in light of the whole record, were not supported by substantial evidence. 
Harken SW Corp. v. Utah Bd. of Oil Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996) 
("Substantial evidence" is "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate 
to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion."). As this Court held, "[W]e will 
not sustain a decision which ignores uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence to the 
contrary." Id 
This Court faces the same inquiry that was before the United States Supreme Court in 
Alaska Pep't: whether, based on the record and the applicable law, the state agency's 
BACT determination for NOx was reasonable. 540 U.S. at 494. Importantly, and in 
contrast to AQB's contention that Sierra Club must demonstrate BACT, the Court 
nowhere required petitioner EPA to show what BACT was. Id at 500-01. The Court 
further noted that, on remand, ADEC could still prepare an appropriate record supporting 
the agency's original BACT selection. Id. at 501. The Court thus concluded that as long 
as ADEC's decision was properly supported by the record, it could come to the same 
BACT determination as it previously had. Id 
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The record amply demonstrates that DAQ's BACT decision was unreasonable.9 
DAQ analyst Mr. Jenks failed to perform the necessary analysis for the BACT 
determination that served as the basis for DAQ's permitting decision. First, DAQ 
adopted its BACT limit from its applicant SPC, which passed it along from a vendor, and 
adopted that limit with limited review, repeating SPC's assertions and copying its charts. 
SPC 1031-35. Second, DAQ based its entire BACT analysis upon the Clearinghouse, 
while ruling out from its analysis: (1) different sized plants; (2) plants that did not burn 
coal; (3) performance tests and actual emissions for currently operating CFBs; 4) control 
strategies for reducing boiler-out NOx emissions; and (5) plants with different averaging 
periods. SPC 4704. As a result, DAQ's BACT limit - which supposedly reflects current 
maximum achievable emission reductions - is based entirely on two 1998 permits and 
several even older than that.10 
DAQ's post hoc attempts to justify its decision fail to overcome the insufficiency 
of its original analysis. For example, AQB asserts that DAQ's BACT determination is 
supported by its finding that 0.10 lb/MMBtu 24-hour NOx limit and 0.07 lb/MMBtu 30-
day average limit are "statistically comparable." SPC 4704. However, while no evidence 
in the record supports this finding, the finding itself is not relevant to the present inquiry 
9To deflect attention from the foundational unreasonableness of its BACT decision, AQB 
erroneously claims Sierra Club bears the burden to "prove that a more stringent emission 
limit was BACT." AQB Br. 30. Sierra Club has no such obligation. See Alaska Dep't 
540 U.S. at 500-01. 
10DAQ's own expert admitted the Clearinghouse is backward-looking and agreed that a 
BACT analysis should be based on more than a search of this database. Trial Tr., vol. 4, 
658, Oct. 1, 2007. DAQ allegedly also relied on web searches and reviews of other 
sources, SPC 4703-04, but such research is not in the record. 
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- whether DAQ's BACT determination was reasonable - because Mr. Jenks testified that 
his original analysis considered plants with 30-day averages not comparable to SPC's 
proposed plant. See SPC 4729:173 (comparing 30-day to 24-hour average limit is like 
comparing "apples and oranges"); SPC 4729:190 ("different averaging periods mean that 
the two permit limits are completely different"). 
Likewise, AQB's reliance on the testimony of Ms. Conger and Mr. Campbell is 
unavailing. Ms. Conger based her analysis on one non-CFB plant with a 0.12 lb/MMBtu 
30-day average permit limit, and her testimony demonstrated only that the plant was not 
meeting a 0,12 lb/MMBtu 24-hour average emission limit, which in no way supports 
AQB's contention that 0.10 lb/MMBtu 24-hour NOx limit and 0.07 lb/MMBtu 30-day 
average limit are "statistically comparable." Mr. Campbell's testimony is similarly 
misplaced, in that none of his assertions are based on actual data that appears in the 
record. Such assertions -without basis or data in the record - cannot adequately support 
DAQ's original BACT decision and do not demonstrate that the decision was reasonable. 
Such an approach is tantamount to letting assertions that lacked basis in the back door as 
the foundation for what must be a reasonable decision. Moreover, AQB ignored 
competent and credible evidence, based on actual use data, presented by Dr. Sahu, 
including results of performance tests for JEA Northside and AES Puerto Rico, SPC 
4929,4903. 
Because DAQ's original NOx determination was based on insufficient analysis in 
the first instance, it was unreasonable and not supported by substantial evidence. The 
Board's post hoc attempts to justify its flawed BACT decision fail to provide the requisite 
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evidence, and ignore credible relevant evidence. Therefore, AQB's NOx BACT limit 
should be vacated by this Court. 
IV. THE BOARD WAS WRONG TO RELY ON THE SILS POLICY. 
A. The SILs "Policy" Required Rulemaking. 
Because DAQ's Significant Impact Levels ("SILs") "policy" was not the subject 
of rulemaking, it is unlawful and invalid.11 Contrary to AQB's unsupported assertion, 
SILs is a written interpretation of both state and federal legal mandates, and is thus 
subject to rulemaking.12 See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-201(3) (rulemaking required when 
agency "issues a written interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate"). In arguing an 
"exception" to the rulemaking requirement applies to SILs, AQB utterly fails to address 
the relevant statutory subsection. This failure is fatal to AQB's argument: even if SILs 
were merely "advisory, informative, or descriptive," to be exempt from rulemaking as 
ABQ claims, it would also have to "not conform to the requirements" of §63G-3-201(3), 
which as a "written interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate," it demonstrably 
does. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-201(4)(c); id § 63G-3-201(3) (emphasis added).13 
11
 Contrary to respondents' assertion, DAQ's exemption of the SPC plant from Class I 
increment analysis is a legal determination reviewed for correctness and accorded no 
deference by this Court. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 
UT74119, 148 P. 3d 960. 
Utah law mandates that DAQ "must" review every new major source to determine 
whether it will cause or contribute to an increment violation and in doing so, "shall take 
into account all allowable emissions of approved sources . . . whether constructed or not." 
R307-405-6(2) (2005, amended 2008). Likewise, federal law mandates that no major 
source "may be constructed . . . unless" it demonstrates that it "will not cause, or 
contribute to" a PSD increment violation. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (2006). 
13
 Likewise, AQB utterly fails to address the analysis in C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime 
Victims' Rep., 966 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (following Williams v. 
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AQB's contention that SILs is a "screening device" or "guidance" that is 
"advisory, informative, or descriptive" ignores the Board's own characterization of SILs 
as a hard-and-fast rule, allowing no exception: "[I]f a source models below the SILs, 
then the analysis is deemed complete." SPC 4714. 
Likewise, DAQ applied SILs like a rule: It declared that because modeled 
concentrations for SPC were less than SILs, "no further analysis was required." SPC 
1027. There was no weighing of factors, no evaluation of recommendations, no 
consideration of suggestions, and no discussion as to whether or how SILs should apply 
to SPC. SPC 1027, 2526-27. Rather, DAQ made its determination - that "no further 
analysis was required" - under the SILs "rule," a rule that is invalid due to DAQ's failure 
to follow proper rulemaking procedure. 
Further, DAQ's adoption of SILs without rulemaking precluded public comment 
SILs' efficacy and levels. Because the SILs "rule" was not properly subjected to 
rulemaking, it is invalid as a matter of law. AQB was wrong to rely upon the invalid 
SILs rule to exempt the SPC plant from cumulative Class I PSD increment analysis. As a 
result, the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the law. 
Utah Pub. Serv. Comm., 720 P.2d 733 (Utah 1986)) (requiring rulemaking when (1) an 
agency's policy is generally applicable; (2) the policy interprets law; and (3) the policy 
alters clearly established law). In the instant case, SILs is generally applicable, as it 
applies to "any new major source or major modification." SPC 0995a. Furthermore, 
SILs interprets state and federal law, namely 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3), UAC R307-405-
6(2), and 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(58)(c). SILs also changes the law: Prior to its adoption, 
DAQ required new sources to undertake cumulative Class I increment analysis; 
afterward, pursuant to SILs, the agency did not require this analysis. Thus, Utah law 
required rulemaking regarding SILs. 
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B. SILs Violates Utah Administrative Code R307-405-6(2). 
In addition to being an invalid "rule" under Utah law, SILs conflicts with the plain 
language of UAC R307-405-6(2), which states that DAQ "must" determine whether a 
new "source will cause or contribute to a violation of the maximum allowable increases" 
or PSD increments. UAC R307-405-6(2). DAQ "shall take into account all allowable 
emissions of approved sources or modifications whether constructed or not, and, to the 
extent practicable, the cumulative effect on air quality of all sources and growth in the 
affected area." Id. (emphasis added). The "main purpose" of this "required" air quality 
analysis "is to demonstrate that new emissions emitted from a proposed major stationary 
source . . . in conjunction with other applicable emissions from existing sources . . . will 
not cause or contribute to a violation of any .. . PSD increment." See Add. E (SIP § 
VIII(D)(1)). Thus, under the plain language of the controlling rule, DAQ is strictly 
obligated to determine the total impacts the new source will create together with the 
emissions from all approved sources in the area. 
AQB appears to argue SILs somehow deems modeling sources that contribute to 
concentrations below SILs as impracticable and therefore modeling in these situations is 
not warranted. AQBBr. 41. This argument lacks merit. Nothing in the record supports 
DAQ's contention that when the contribution of a source to increment is below SILs, 
cumulative increment analysis is somehow not practicable. See, e.g. SPC 4289-90. 
Indeed, DAQ attempts to rely on both SPC's and the National Park Service's ("NPS") 
cumulative Class I increment analyses, thereby evidencing the agency's opinion that such 
analysis actually is quite feasible. Moreover, no connection exists between the 
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contribution a facility makes to increment consumption and the practicability of 
undertaking cumulative Class I increment analysis, and AQB refers to none. 
C. Properly Determining Increment Consumption Is Not Trivial. 
As a key part of the regulatory scheme that protects air quality in our National 
Parks, properly determining increment consumption - the heart of cumulative Class I 
increment analysis - is not, as AQB suggests, a pointless exercise. First, UAC R307-
405-6(2) and the SIP both require DAQ, without exception, to determine whether a 
source will cause or contribute to an increment violation by taking into account all 
allowable emissions of approved sources. See UAC R307-405-6(2); see also Add. E (SIP 
§ VIII(D)(1)). The Clean Air Act requires state implementation plans to contain 
"measures assuring that maximum allowable increases over baseline concentrations [i.e., 
increments] ... shall not be exceeded'' 42 U.S.C. § 7473(a) (emphasis added). Plainly, 
the law does not consider the analysis a trivial pursuit. Moreover, both EPA and NPS 
requested that, notwithstanding SILs, DAQ require cumulative Class I increment 
analysis.14 Finally, even a small contribution to concentration of pollutants in a Class I 
area can consume a significant portion of the remaining increment. For example, as EPA 
notes, SPC's own analysis shows that 83.2% of the 24-hour and 53.2% of the 3-hour S02 
Class I increment at Capitol Reef National Park will be consumed once the SPC facility 
begins to operate. See SPC 4303. Thus, even according to SPC's own calculations, the 
14See SPC 0983 (NPS "is very concerned with the rapid development of new coal-fired 
power plants in the vicinity of [Utah's] five Class I parks); SPC 4303 (EPA comments: 
"Potentially overlapping ambient impacts of multiple pending energy projects should be 
considered."). 
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new facility will consume, all on its own, 21% of the remaining 24-hour S02 Class I 
increment. 
D. Sierra Club Has Suffered Substantial Prejudice. 
AQB is wrong to claim that Sierra Club has not shown the substantial prejudice 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4) (renumbered 2008) (formerly § 63-46b-
16(4)). If meaningful review is precluded by an agency's own action, the error is 
prejudicial and reversible, and any doubts as to prejudice are resolved against the agency. 
See Adams v. Board of Rev, of Ind. Comm., 821 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(recognizing "substantial prejudice inherent" in commission's failure to make adequate 
findings); Angell v. Board of Rev, of Ind. Coram., 750 P.2d 611, 613 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). Because DAQ adopted SILs and failed to conduct its own analysis, it is 
impossible to know, as AQB claims, that a proper analysis would have made no 
difference to its permitting process. AQB's own failure has precluded review of its 
unperformed analysis, and the substantial prejudice required by § 63G-4-403(4) is 
inherent in its actions. 
V. DAO'S RELIANCE ON SPC'S ANALYSIS IS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS. 
Not only is DAQ's post hoc dependence on the SPC sulfur dioxide (S02) 
increment analysis unreasonable because the agency in no way based its permitting 
decision on the modeling, the analysis itself is legally insufficient because it fails to 
15
 83.2% of 5 (ig/m3 (24-hour S02 Class I increment) equals 4.16 |ig/m3 minus SPC's 
contribution (.177 |ug/m3) equals 3.98 |ug/m3 - the current concentration of S02 modeled 
at Capitol Reef. Therefore, SPC's contribution (.177^g/m3) equals 21 % of the remaining 
increment .84 |ig/m3 (5 ^g/m3 - 4.16 |ig/m3). SPC 0280. 
29 
protect air quality at our National Parks. SPC s short cuts include the use of SILs, the 
failure to include Hunter 1, the failure to model air quality as of SPC s startup date, the 
reliance on annual averages, and the dependence on extra-record modeling and analysis. 
The regulatory scheme fails to comply with UAC R307-405-6(2) (2005) and therefore is 
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. AQB's reliance on this inadequate modeling 
should be vacated. 
A, No Evidence Supports Excluding Hunter 1. 
Only if construction on Hunter 1 commenced before January 6,1975 should 
emissions from the plant be exempt from cumulative S02 Class I increment analysis.16 
AQB provides no evidence to show construction on the plant commenced before January 
6, 1975. As a result, the plant's emissions must be modeled in cumulative Class I 
increment analysis. 
AQB asserts Exhibits 12 through 18 support SPC's exclusion of Hunter 1 from its 
cumulative analysis. AQB Br. 45. However, Exhibits 14, 15 and 16 merely address 
whether construction on Hunter 1 commenced before June 1,1975, the relevant date for 
requiring a PSD permit. No exhibit cited by AQB even mentions January 6, 1975, much 
less provides evidence that construction of Hunter I commenced before that date. The 
Board focuses on Exhibit 13, in which EPA offers several factors to consider in 
16
 "Emissions of sulfur oxides . . . from any major emitting facility on which construction 
commenced after January 6, 1975, shall not be included in the baseline and shall be 
counted against the maximum allowable increases in pollutant concentrations". 42 
U.S.C. § 7479(4) (Supp. I 1977); Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 376-77 ("[EJmissions of 
sulfur dioxide . . . from major facilities on which construction began after January 6, 
1975, are not grandfathered into the baseline but rather count against the increments"). 
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determining construction commencement prior to the June 1, 1975 PSD permit date, but 
says nothing specific to any plant, including Hunter 1, regarding the relevant January 6, 
1975 construction commencement date. Nor does any exhibit or testimony in the record 
apply or make findings with regard to the Exhibit 13 factors. Thus, there simply exists no 
evidence that construction commenced on Hunter 1 prior to January 6, 1975. 
In light of the only evidence in the record that actually establishes when 
construction commenced on Hunter 1 - SPC 4808 (construction began in March 1975) 
and SPC 4809 (applying the CAA definition of "commence construction" stating 
contracts executed February 27, 1975; on-site construction work commenced on or about 
April 29, 1975) - the Board erred in failing to require the inclusion of Hunter 1 in 
cumulative Class I increment analysis.17 Compare SPC 4328-4334. 
B. The Record Refutes AQB's Finding that IPP Unit 3 Was Not Required To Be 
Included. 
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Code, DAQ "must" determine "as the 
source's projected start-up date," whether a new major source will cause or contribute to 
a violation of PSD increments by, inter alia, taking "into account all allowable emissions 
of approved sources or modifications, whether constructed or not[.]" UAC R307-405-
6(2) (2005). The AQB concedes that "IPP Unit 3 received its approval order before the 
predicted Sevier Power start-up date." AQB Br. 48. Thus, under the plain language of 
17
 AQB's inference from EPA's alleged silence regarding DAQ's failure to include 
Hunter 1 in its cumulative Class I increment analysis that EPA tacitly supported this 
failure is not well taken. By applying its invalid SILs rule, DAQ exempted SPC from 
such analysis, so no analysis existed upon which EPA could comment. Indeed, EPA 
commented that cumulative Class I increment analysis was missing and should be 
included. SPC 1129. 
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the rule, IPP Unit 3, as an "approved source" as of the predicted start-up date for the SPC 
facility, should have been included in the increment analysis. 
AQB argues that "the inventory of increment-consuming sources used for a 
cumulative analysis only includes sources that are approved at the time the analysis is 
performed." This argument finds no support in rule or law and is contrary to the rule's 
plain language. AQB Br. 49; see Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d 
1142, 1145 (Utah 1995) ("Statutes and administrative rules should generally be construed 
according to their plain language."). Nothing in UAC R307-405(6)(2) supports AQB's 
assertion, and its interpretation would read the phrase "as of the source's projected start-
up date" out of the rule and replace it with text found nowhere in the rule. See Thomas 
Edison Charter School v. Retirement Bd., 2008 UT App 221,111, — P.3d — ("It is [the 
appellate court's] duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force and 
effect" (citations omitted)). 
C. The Board Cannot Rely on NPS Cumulative Class I Increment Analysis. 
The Board's repeated suggestions that it properly relied upon NPS cumulative 
Class I increment analysis are misleading and without merit. AQB Br. 40, 47-48, 49, 50. 
The NPS analysis was not complete: its modeling covered only the 24-hour average S02 
increment, and therefore says nothing about compliance with the equally significant 3-
hour and annual average increments for S02. See SPC 4311. Therefore, AQB may not 
rely on NPS data to imply that modeling for 3-hour and annual increments that included 
Hunter 1 and IPP 3 was performed. Furthermore, there is no evidence that DAQ 
reviewed the NPS analysis prior to, or even after, its permitting decision. The only 
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evidence regarding the NPS analysis is a letter from the agency saying it was done. See 
SPC4305-17.18 
D. Reliance on SPC's Cumulative Class I Sulfur Dioxide Increment Analysis Is 
Unreasonable Because SPC Underestimated Its Short-Term Impacts. 
Because SPC's analysis fails to guarantee compliance with the law, DAQ's 
reliance on that analysis is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and should not be 
upheld by this Court. To protect our National Parks and other Class I areas, Congress 
established three increments for S02 - the 3-hour, 24-hour and annual average 
increments. 42 U.S.C. §7473(b)(l); UAC R307-405-4. If the 3-hour and 24-hour 
increments are exceeded at a Class I area more than once a year, an increment violation 
exists and the law is violated. 42 U.S.C. § 7473(a); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c). As a result, 
prior to permitting a source, DAQ must guarantee, using cumulative analysis, that the 
source will not cause or contribute to a S02 increment violation. UAC R307-405-6(2); 42 
U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3). 
Moreover, DAQ's categorical rejection of contemporaneous NPS increment modeling 
analysis casts doubt on AQB's embrace of NPS cumulative impact modeling. Director 
Heying completely rejected NPS modeling showing the SPC facility would exceed Class 
I S02 SILs: "I don't know how they made that determination. The Park Service has never 
provided the input data, the met data that they used to determine that number. They - it's 
not been subject to public review." Trial Tr. vol. 3, 369-70, Oct. 3, 2007. Reasoning that 
led DAQ to snub NPS SILs modeling requires it to likewise reject the NPS cumulative 
Class I increment modeling - DAQ did not rely on the modeling to make its permitting 
decision, did not make the modeling part of the record, did not open it to public or EPA 
review, and did not evaluate the modeling itself, including the "input and met data." 
DAQ cannot randomly pick and choose among NPS modeling runs, rejecting one but 
embracing the other as it suits the agency. Such unreasoned action is arbitrary and 
capricious. 
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DAQ failed to meet its obligation by relying on SPC's cumulative analysis. That 
analysis improperly attempts to determine compliance with short-term (3-hour and 24-
hour) increments using long-term annual average emission rates for Utah's existing 
sources. As Dr. Milford unequivocally testified, use of annual averages to calculate 
impact on short-term increments underestimates the level of increment consumption in 
Utah's National Parks.19 SPC 3198. Utah's increment-consuming sources frequently 
emit S02 pollution at rates significantly higher than their annual average rates over the 
shorter time periods protected by the 3-hour and 24-hour average S02 increments, and 
several sources will emit S02 at these higher rates at the same time. Modeling 
performed with annual average emissions rates masks these frequent higher emission 
rates and therefore understates them. Id Such understated rates fail to provide an 
accurate picture of the overall impacts, which is why the law requires full analysis. 
Nowhere does AQB dispute Dr. Milford's analysis of the emissions data. In fact, 
DAQ's witness, Director Heying, testified her analysis led to graphs and charts that were 
"exactly" the same as those Dr. Milford produced, and its own modeler testified that 
annual emission rates do not accurately reflect 3-hour and 24-hour rates. Trial Tr. vol. 2, 
256, 281, Oct.1, 2007; D. Prey Dep. at 51: 9-24; 49-50; SPC 4393. Rather, AQB based 
19
 Comments on Utah's power plant projects agree almost universally with Dr. Milford's 
conclusion that annual averages underestimate impact on short term increment. See, e.g., 
SPC 4349 (EPA regarding IPP 3: "maximum historical short-term emission rates . . . are 
considerably higher than the annual average rates" and, for example "the maximum 3-
hour emission rate for S02 during 2001-2002 was 9 times higher than the annual average 
emission rate for [IPP] Unit 2 and 15 times higher for Hunter Unit 3"; concluding 
"increment modeling should be revised to use the actual short term emission rates") 
(emphasis added); SPC 4312 & fn. 6. (Park Service: analysis should use maximum 
actual short-term emission rates for existing sources). 
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its findings on three untenable premises: 1) most often, sources emit pollution at rates 
close to their annual average rates; 2) rarely will all relevant Utah sources simultaneously 
emit air pollution at their maximum short-term average rates; and 3) sources cannot emit 
air pollution at their maximum short-term average emission rates all the time. Trial Tr. 
vol. 2, 266-69, Oct. 1, 2007. These premises, however, are irrelevant to protecting 
increment. Short-term average increments are not meant to protect against what happens, 
on average, over the course of months and years, nor are they meant to protect against 
what sources do most of the time. That is the role of the annual average increment. 
Rather, 3-hour and 24-hour average increments protect against events when, for short 
periods of time, one or more sources emit at higher or significantly higher rates than 
usual. As Dr. Milford explained: 
The time horizon for the [cumulative Class I increment] analysis is the lifetime of 
the new facility, which can be 40 years or more . . . . With only one exceedance 
allowed per year for the 3-hour and 24-hour increments, the analysis is meant to 
provide protection against even infrequent occurrences of elevated air pollution. 
SPC 3197. Thus, the Board's stated grounds fail even to address Dr. Milford's central 
thesis that annual averages underestimate impacts on short-term increment because 
averaging over a year masks short-term, higher emission rates - smoothes them out - and 
thus does not account for them. As a result, the use of annual average S02 emissions 
relied on by SPC and accepted by DAQ is legally insufficient for guaranteeing that a 
20AQB misconstrues Dr. Milford's testimony. See AQB Br. at 51. Contrary to AQB's 
implication, Dr. Milford did not testify that "the question of which emissions to use" was 
"unsettled" in any way, because it is not. Dr. Milford's testified merely that the weight of 
authority to be given to the North Dakota MOU and the NSR Manual, given the fact that 
neither is final agency action, is unsettled. SPC 4172-73. 
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source will not cause or contribute to a violation of the short-term average S02 
increment. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (1977). Because the evidence shows that using 
annual average emissions fails to satisfy the legal obligation to ensure that short-term 
average S02 increments are not exceed, any reliance by AQB on SPC's flawed S02 
increment analysis is entirely unreasonable. 
VI. THE PURPORTED APPROVAL OF THE 18-MONTH EXTENSION WAS 
ILLEGAL. 
The Board affirmed DAQ's 18-month extension of SPC's OA without any formal 
review, notice, public comment or requirement of ongoing B ACT analysis to ensure that 
future construction will incorporate all available pollution controls. AQB based its 
decision on UAC R307-401-11, since renumbered R307-401-18, which at that time it 
interpreted as requiring no formal review, input, or ongoing BACT analysis. 
Significantly, the State of Utah now interprets the same language of UAC R307-
401-18 in line with its federal counterpart, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2). AQB Br. at 53. 
Currently, therefore, both the federal rule and the state rule require continuing BACT 
analysis, as well as public involvement, as a condition of not revoking an AO when 
construction has not commenced within 18 months of its issuance. Pet'r Br. Add. D. 
One reason for the 18-month provision, according to a current Utah DAQ official, 
is to "ensure that major emitting facilities . . . are constructed in accordance with 
reasonably current pollution control standards and on the basis of current information 
regarding the level of air pollution in the locality where the facility is to be located." 
Pet'r Br. Add. D. The respondents herein do not address the glaring problem that, 
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pursuant to the indefinite extension in this case without public input or requiring formal 
BACT analysis, the SPC plant may be constructed years in the future based upon wholly 
outdated technology in obvious violation of the letter and spirit of the Clean Air Act's 
BACT provisions. 
The respondents, moreover, concede the SPC proposal is a "new major stationary 
source" subject to 40 C.F.R. § 52.21, which in turn requires prevention of significant 
deterioration of air quality (PSD) in areas that already have attained certain air quality 
standards, known as "attainment areas." They concede the SPC proposal is subject to 40 
C.F.R. § 52.21, including the strict 18-month revocation language in § 52.21(r)(2). They 
then offer complex explanations why they are subject to, but not actually bound by, 40 
C.F.R. § 52.21, and why they may interpret the extension provision of UAC R307-401-18 
far less stringently than 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2). 
The respondents' explanations fly straight in the face of two inescapable 
regulatory mandates: Rule 52.21 itself, and Utah's State Implementation Plan (SIP). 
A. Rule 52.21, by Its Own Terms, Is Incorporated into Utah's SIP. 
Rule 52.21 expressly incorporates itself into every SIP: 
(2)(i) The requirements of this section apply to the construction of any new 
major stationary source (as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of this section) or 
any project at an existing major stationary source in an area designated as 
attainment or unclassifiable under sections 107(d)( 1 )(A)(ii) or (iii) of the 
Act. 
(ii) The requirements of paragraphs (j) through (r) of this section apply to 
the construction of any new major stationary source or the major 
modification of any existing major stationary source, except as this section 
otherwise provides. 
40 C.F.R. §52.21(a)(2). 
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Later in the same regulation, exceptions to the application of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 to 
state plans are expressly listed. 40 C.F.R. § 52.2l(i). The 18-month provision of 40 
C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2) is not excepted. Because the SPC proposal is a major stationary 
source, subsection (r)(2) applies to the SPC AO. Subsection (r)(2) presumes revocation 
of the SPC AO absent good cause. Pursuant to the DAQ's own interpretation, subsection 
(r)(2) requires that any non-revocation and extension of the AO beyond 18-months be 
based upon public input and ongoing BACT analysis. 
B. The EPA Previously Amended Utah's SIP, along with Every Other SIP, 
to Incorporate the Provisions of Rule 52.21(r)(2). 
EPA's very approval of Utah's SIP expressly requires adherence to 40 C.F.R. § 
52.21, including subsection (r)(2). 40 C.F.R. § 52.2346 (2003). While respondent SPC's 
brief quoted section (a) of the approval regulation, it inexplicably omitted section (b), 
which mandates Utah's compliance with 40 C.F.R. § 52.21, including subsection (r)(2): 
(a) The Utah plan, as submitted, is approved as meeting the requirements of 
Part C, Title I, of the Clean Air Act, except that it does not apply to sources 
proposing to construct on Indian Reservations. 
(b) Regulation for prevention of significant deterioration of air quality. The 
provisions of § 52.21 except paragraph (a)(1) are hereby incorporated 
and made a part of the Utah State implementation plan and are 
applicable to proposed major stationary sources or major modifications to 
be located on Indian Reservations. 
40 C.F.R. § 52.2346 (emphasis added). 
Respondent AQB's brief, at 60-61, asserts without analysis that 40 C.F.R. § 
52.2346(b) only requires adherence to 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 on Indian land. The plain 
language of the provision refutes any such interpretation. Section (b) plainly incorporates 
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40 C.F.R. § 52.21 into the state plan, and applies the same provisions to Indian land. 
This also is consistent with 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(i)-(ii) (quoted supra) that expressly 
applies portions of 52.21 to the states, including subsection (r)(2). AQB's interpretation 
also ignores that a state generally has no authority to conduct new source review ("NSR") 
in Indian country. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD), 68 Fed. Reg. 74483, 74485 (Dec. 24, 2003) ("The 
Federal government is currently the NSR reviewing authority in Indian country.") AQB's 
interpretation is erroneous for four additional reasons based upon 68 Fed. Reg. 74483, et 
seq., which amended Utah's SIP in December 2003. 
First, the interpretation limiting the 2003 incorporation of § 52.21 merely to Indian 
Reservations runs counter to EPA's introductory explanation of the 2003 SIP 
amendments. There EPA explains that the SIP amendments are merely making clear 
what EPA had previously done, to wit, incorporated Rule 52.21 into every SIP: 
The 1978 final rule also incorporated section 52.21 by reference into 
the SIPs for 54 programs (50 States, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, 
American Samoa, and Guam) as follows: 
(a) The requirements of sections 160 through 165 of the Clean Air Act are 
not met, since the plan does not include approvable procedures for 
preventing the significant deterioration of air quality. 
(b) The provisions of section 52.21 (b) through (v) are hereby 
incorporated and made part of the applicable State plan for the State 
of. (see 43 Fed. Reg. 26410). 
68 Fed. Reg. 74483, 74484 (Dec. 3, 2003) (emphasis added). 
Second, EPA further explains that the purpose of the 2003 SIP amendments is to 
ensure that any and all future changes to Rule 52.21 will similarly apply to all SIPs: 
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Today's rule differs in one respect from the previous action to revise the 
Federal implementation portions of State plans. In the previous rule, we 
incorporated the relevant subsection 52.21 by referring to the paragraphs as 
"(a)(2) and (b) to (bb).fl The purpose of that reference was to incorporate all 
the substantive provisions of 52.21. Today's rule adopts a different 
cross-referencing format—"40 CFR 52.21 except paragraph (a)(1)/1 
Using this format, the Agency intends for the Federal implementation 
plan portions of State plans to automatically update whenever new 
sections are added to 52.21. 
68 Fed. Reg. 74483, 74485 (Dec. 2003) (emphasis added). 
Third, the December 2003 amendment to SIPs in states and districts that do not 
have an Indian Reservation merely employs the incorporation language to that state or 
district and omits reference to "Indian Reservations." For example: 
§ 52.499 Significant deterioration of air quality. 
(b) Regulations for preventing significant deterioration of air quality. The 
provisions of § 52.21 except paragraph (a)(1) are hereby incorporated and 
made a part of the applicable State plan for the District of Columbia. 
68 Fed. Reg. 74483, 74488 (Dec. 2003). Similar wording as that for the District of 
Columbia is also used in states that do not contain Indian Reservations, such as Illinois 
and Massachusetts. By omitting reference to "Indian Reservations," the amendments 
where there are no Indian Reservations merely make clear that Rule 52.21 is incorporated 
into the SIP. For states and districts that do not have Indian Reservations, no amendment 
of any kind would be necessary if incorporation of Rule 52.21 were only intended to 
apply in Indian Country. 
Fourth, that EPA approved Utah's plan as written does not mean it approved 
AQB's interpretation of the 18-month provision in a manner that was far less stringent 
than the parallel provisions of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2). The express language of 40 
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C.F.R. §§ 52.21(a)(2) and 52.2346(b), and EPA's 2003 explanation of the purpose for 
amending the SIP's, including Utah's, prevent any such conclusion. 
The Board's closed-door and indefinite extension of SPC's initial AO must be 
vacated, and AQB ordered either io revoke the AO, or to subject any extension request to 
public input and continuing BACT analysis as required by federal law, as well as by 
AQB's current practice. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Board's decision and remand with instructions to: 
(1) Include carbon dioxide and IGCC in its BACT analysis; 
(2) Conduct a BACT analysis of NOx that includes relevant and more recent data; 
(3) Conduct Class I increment analysis; 
(4) Conduct adequate increment analysis of 3- and 24-hour S02 emissions; and 
(5) Revoke the 2004 AO unless and until SPC updates its plans to include all new 
and feasible technology to achieve maximum pollution control. 
DATED this A day of September, 2008. 
COUNSEL FOR UTAH CHAPTER 
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Docket No. 2008CV146398 
FINAL ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Judicial Review of the final 
decision and other orders of the Administrative Law Judge (ALT) regarding the issuance 
of a permit to Respondent Longleaf Energy Associates, LLC (Longleaf) to construct and 
operate a 1200 megawatt coal-fired power plant in Early County, Georgia. The plant as 
petmitted would annually emit large amounts of air pollutants, including 8-9 million tons 
of carbon dioxide; thousands of tons of sulfur dioxide; nitrogen oxides: particulate 
matter; sulfuric acid mist; and other hazardous air pollutants, including mercurv. 
Opt-Out; x** 
Petitioners challenged the permit and the matter was assigned to an ALJ for hearing and 
disposition. 
Petitioners' First Amended Petition asserted 17 counts set out in great detail in 213 
separate paragraphs. Some of those counts were ultimately withdrawn. The ALJ granted 
Respondents summary relief on others, and after receiving evidence and argument, the 
ALJ dismissed Petitioners' remaining counts and upheld the permit in all regards in a 
final decision dated January 11, 2008. The Petition for Judicial Review was timely filed 
in this Court The parties submitted briefs and appeared and were heard through counsel 
on June 3,2008, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS COURT 
This Court's review of the ALJ's decision is appellate in nature. Children's 
Hosp. v. Go, Dep't of Med Assistance, 235 Ga. App. 697,700 (Ga. App. 1998). The 
Petition for Judicial Review presents questions of law, and this Court reviews such 
questions de novo. Davis v* Turpmy 273 Ga. 244,246 (2007). A de novo standard also 
governs this Courf s review of the ALPs grant of summary determination. Children's 
Hosp., 235 Ga. App. at 700. 
RULINGS ON THE ISSUES 
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C, §§ 7401 et seq. (Act) includes a number of 
regulatory programs ^o protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so 
as to promote the public health and welfare and productive capacity of its population . . , 
r 42 U.S.C § 7401(b)(1), The Act is federally administered by the United States 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which has promulgated regulations to carry out 
the Act and to regulate substances considered "air pollutants.7' Some of those regulations 
prescribe National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which are national limits 
for a few particular pollutants. See 40 C.F.R. Pt 50. Many of the regulations under the 
Act, however, regulate pollutants under different regimes. 
Areas within the United States are categorized as either "attainment areas" or 
"non-attainment areas/' An attainment area is one in which the pollution levels are 
within all of the prescribed NAAQS limits. Early County is an attainment area. Because 
it is an attainment area, the Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration CPSD) 
limitations apply, and those require that any new "major emitting facility" receive a PSD 
permit and comply with the permit's conditions. Hie administrative review of the PSD 
peirnit application is handled by the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the 
Georgia Department of Natural Resources. 
There is no dispute that the proposed power plant would be a "major emitting 
facility" as defined by the Act because it is a 'fossil-fuel fired steam electric plant" of a 
size far greater than the statutory threshold 42 U.S.C § 7479(1). The proposed plant 
would also emit far more air pollutants than the statutory threshold. Id. Because the 
proposed plant would be a "major emitting facility,*3 Longleaf must incorporate the "best 
available [pollution] control technology" (BACT), which is defined as follows: 
The term "best available control technology'5 means an emission limitation based 
on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under 
this Act emitted from OT which results from any major emitting facility, which the 
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, 
3 
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environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for 
such facility through application of production processes and available methods, 
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or 
innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant. 
42'U.S.C § 7479(3). 
For every "pollutant subject to regulation under the Act/1 the BACT analysis 
requires a series of steps from identifying the appropriate technologies to evaluate; 
evaluating the comparative effectiveness of those technologies in controlling pollution 
emissions; the assessment of other specified considerations; and, ultimately, a decision 
concerning which technology is the "best available control technology." The emission 
limitations in the facility's permit must be set based on that "best available control 
technology/* 
Petitioners claim that the permit and the ALJ rulings concerning the application of 
BACT to the Longleaf plant are legally erroneous. These contentions relate to three 
separate issues — carbon dioxide emissions; particulate matter emissions; and alternative 
combustion technology known as IGCC. 
*• THE AJLTS STAJNPARD OF REVIEW 
Petitioners also raise several procedural issues that go to the ALJ's substantive 
rulings. First, Petitioners assert that the A U erred across the board by failing to make de 
novo findings and decisions. The Court has carefully reviewed the final decision of the 
ALJ, and it is clear that the ALJ did not make de novo findings or decisions concerning 
emission limitations or other issues. The A U repeatedly rejected contentions of 
Petitioners not because the facts did not support the Petitioners* position, but because the 
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ALJ concluded that EPD's decision was not "unreasonable."1 If the law required the ALJ 
to make a de novo decision, the final decision is fatally flawed for failure to do so. 
The Court concludes that a de novo decision should have been rendered. Under 
the statutory scheme that governs EPD actions like the permitting decision here, the ALJ 
sits in lieu of the Board of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). While the DNR 
Board would have the plenary authority and responsibility to make a de novo decision, 
that authority was transferred by statute to the Office of State Administrative Hearings 
(OS AH) and the A U s therein. Under the law as it pertains to this type of challenge, any 
person, such as Petitioners, who are "aggrieved or adversely affected by any order or 
action of the director [of EPD] shall, upon petition to the director within 30 days after the 
issuance of such order and the taking of such action, have a right to a hearing before an 
administrative law judge of the Office of State Administrative Hearings ,. > acting in 
place of the Board of Natural Resources" O.CG.A. § 12~2~2(c)(2)(A)(italics added). 
The statute goes on to state that "the decision of the administrative law judge shall 
constitute the final decision of the board." O.C.GA, § 12-2-2(c)(2)(B). 
Not only was the ALJ acting as the DNR board in this case with authority to 
determine all aspects of the instant permit de novo, the specific rules of OSAH dictate 
that this proceeding should have been determined de novo, OSAH Rule 21(3) provides 
3
 Typical of the ALTs reasoning is the statement that "the Director's determinations should be 
affirmed if they are within the scope of her authority, constitute a reasonable exercise of her 
discretion, and satisfy the requirements of law. This tribunal should not substitute its equally 
reasonable determination for the Director's reasonable determination." Final decision at 65, 
That is not a de novo decision. 
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that: "The hearing shall be de novo in nature " OSAH Rule 21(1) further states that 
"the ALJ shall make an independent determination on the basis of the competent 
evidence presented at the hearing. -. [and] the ALJ may make any disposition of the 
matter as is available to the [DNR]-" While the State Respondents contend that this rule 
pertains only to the "burden of proof/* that is plainly incorrect It requires a de novo 
hearing in clear and explicit language that cannot reasonably be construed otherwise. 
The Court has reviewed the abundant authority on this issue cited by the parties. 
To the extent that any of those authorities suggest that a "reasonableness" standard has a 
place in administrative hearings, they pertain to different situations or statutes where 
"reasonableness" is, for example, a specific element of the matter at issue. It is clear 
from these authorities that the ALJ should have made a de novo decision in this case, and 
the final decision is erroneous in all of its findings and decisions for failure to do so. 
H- EMISSION LIMITATION FOR CARBON DIOXIDE 
As to the first of these, carbon dioxide> it is undisputed that no BACT analysis was 
done. There was no effort to identify, evaluate, or apply available technologies that 
would control CG2 emissions, and the permit contains no C02 emission limits. 
The ruling of the ALJ can be upheld on this issue only if carbon dioxide is not an 
air "pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." Otherwise, the statute requires a 
BACT emission limit for C02, The argument had been advanced before the permit 
issued here that C02 was not an "air pollutant* * under the Act, but that argument was 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct 1438 
6 
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(2007). Faced with the ruling in Massachusetts that C02 is an "air pollutant" under the 
Act, Respondents are forced to argue that C02 is still not a "pollutant subject to 
regulation under the Act" Respondents' position is untenable. Putting aside the 
argument that any substance that falls within the statutory definition of "air pollutant" 
may be "subject to*' regulation under the Act, there is no question that CO2 is "subject to 
regulation under the Act." 
Respondents acknowledge, for example, that the regulatory Tegime under the 
Clean Air Act mandates monitoring of C02 emissions. The failure to conduct required 
monitoring under the Act's regulations is subject to criminal sanction, and a person who 
knowingly submits false monitoring reports may be subject to a felony prosecution. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C § 7113(c)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 100L Respondents do not dispute that the 
failure to comply with these C02 regulations is enforceable by criminal sanction. 
In addition to the C02 monitoring regulations m Part 75 of Title 40 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, Petitioners have provided the Court with many other examples of 
Clean Air Act regulations that address C02. Respondents effectively ignore these 
regulatory structures by contending that BACT limits should apply to a pollutant only if it 
is also capped or controlled by some other general limit Thus, Longleaf argues that C0 2 
is not "controlled or limited" by the Clean Air Act as the basis fox contending that BACT 
should not apply. (Longleaf Brief, p. 38). The BACT statute is plainly broader than that, 
however^ encompassing all pollutants that are "subject to regulation" under the Act, 
whether or not they are independently subject to NAAQS or other general limits. The 
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ALJ clearly erred, in light of the regulatory schemes that in fact address C02, in stating 
that "EPA has not promulgated a [NAAQS] for C02> has not listed CO2 as a regulated 
pollutant in any section of the CAA, ami has not established any other regulations for 
C02" (Memorandum Opinion and Order of Dec. 4 8,2007, p. 6)(italics added). 
If the BACT requirement were limited as Respondents urge, Congress presumably 
would have used narrower language in the BACT provision, as it did elsewhere in the 
Act. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k)(addressing quantitative "emission limitations"). The 
regulatory definition of air pollutants that require BACT determinations is also 
inconsistent with Respondents* position. The parties agree that a BACT analysis and 
emission limitation is required for all "regulated NSR2 pollutants," 40 CJF,R. § 
52.21©(2). The parties also agree that a "regulated NSR pollutant" is defined in EPA's 
regulations as follows: 
(50) Regulated NSR pollutant, for purposes of this section, means the 
following: 
(i) Any pollutant for which a national ambient air quality standard has been 
promulgated and any constituents or precursors for such pollutants 
identified by the Administrator (e.g., volatile organic compounds and NOX 
are precursors for ozone); 
(ii) Any pollutant that is subject to any standard promulgated under section 
111 of the Act; 
(iii) Any Class I or II substance subject to a standard promulgated under or 
established by title VI of the Act; or 
(iv) Any pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act; 
except that any or all hazardous air pollutants either listed in section i 12 of 
* "NSR'1" refers to "new source review/1 
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the Act or added to the list pursuant to section 112(b)(2) of the Act, which 
have not been delisted pursuant to section 112(b)(3) of the Act, are not 
regulated NSR pollutants unless the listed hazardous air pollutant is also 
regulated as a constituent or precursor of a general pollutant listed under 
section 108 of the Act. 
40CF.R-§52.2I(b)(50). 
The interpretation of this regulation urged by Respondents, and accepted by the 
ALJ, contradicts the plain meaning of the regulation. Limiting BACT determinations to 
those air pollutants for which there is a separate, general numerical limitation effectively 
ignores part (iv) of the regulation that sweeps in all pollutants that are "otherwise subject 
to regulation under the Act" Since C02 is "otherwise subject to regulation under the 
Act," a PSD permit cannot issue for Longleaf without CO2 emission limitations based on 
a BACT analysis, 
EGL MODELING FOR FINE PARTICULATE MATTER 
Petitioners' next contention concerns particulate matter. There are two distinct 
forms of particulate matter, each defined by particle size. PM)0 includes all particulate 
matter that is 10 microns or less in size. PM2.5 includes all particulate matter that is 2.5 
microns or less. See 40 C.FJR. §§ 50.6 & 50.7. 
PMiohas long been one of the pollutants for which there has been a national, or 
NAAQS, standard. Based on studies concerning the adverse health impacts of very small 
particulate matter, the EPA in 1997 also promulgated a separate NAAQS requirement for 
PMZ5> See 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (July 18,1997), The EPA found the new PM2.5 standard 
necessary because of health risks that included "premature mortality and increased 
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hospital admissions and emergency room visits . , . ; increased respiratory symptoms and 
disease, in children and individuals with cardiopulmonary disease such as asthma; 
decreased lung function, particularly in children and individuals with asthma; and 
alterations in lung tissue and structure and in respiratory tract defense mechanisms/' Id. 
The PM2 5 NAAQS was made even more stringent in 2006 because of additional health-
risk studies. 71 Fed. Reg. 61,143 (OcL 17,2006). 
Because PMZ5 is an air pollutant that is subject to NAAQS, Longieaf was required 
to prove that the national PM2.5 standard would not be exceeded as a result of the plant's 
construction. 
No major emitting facility on which construction is commenced after 
August 771977, may be constructed [in any attainment area) unless —"• . . 
(3) the owner or operator of such facility demonstrates, as required pursuant 
to section 7410(j) of this titls, that emissions from . . . such facility will not 
cause, or contribute to, air pollution in excess of any . . . (B) national 
ambient air quality standard 
(4) the proposed facility is subject to the best available control technology 
for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter emitted from, or 
which results from, such facility;... 
42 U.$.C> § 7475(a). 
The dispute here arises over what has been called "surrogate" evaluation of PM2.5 
emissions. The so-called surrogate approach uses modeling for PMJO emissions to 
examine PM2.5 compliance. EPA "guidance" has been written that allows a surrogate 
approach in some circumstances. Petitioners do not contend that the use of a PMI0 
surrogate evaluation is never appropriate. For example,, Respondents rely upon an 
10 
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administrative decision arising from Illinois, In Re Prairie State Generating Company, 
PSD Appeal Number 05-05 (EPA Environmental Appeals Board). In that case, PM!0 
modeling was used as a surrogate for assessing PM2j> pollution by assuming a worst case 
scenario - Le.9 that all particulate matter included within the 10 micron or less range fell 
within the 0.0 to 2.5 micron range. Since that worst case analysis showed that the PM2.5 
NAAQS would not be exceeded as a matter if fact in Prairie Slate, the surrogate 
approach fully answered the legal issue concerning PM2j compliance. 
The circumstances here are very different than in Prairie State. Instead of 
employing PM10 modeling as a useful worst-case approximation for PM2.5 emissions, 
Longleaf made no effort at all to show that the PM2.s NAAQS would be satisfied. Had 
the worst-case approach of Prairie State been followed here, it predicted that the PM2.5 
NAAQS would be exceeded, in violation of the Clean Air Act Moreover, Petitioners 
offered affirmative evidence from their expert who specifically modeled for and 
determined the actual PM2 j levels that would occur in the Early County attainment area if 
the Longleaf plant were built. He concluded that "modeling of PM2.5 shows 
concentrations during normal operations will exceed the 24-hour NAAQS (National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards).'* (Tran Affidavit). Nevertheless, the ALJ granted 
Respondents7 motion for summary determination on the PM2j issue, concluding that the 
PM10 modeling Longleaf performed was sufficient, as a matter of law. 
The Court concludes that the ALJ erred The issue here is not whether PMJO 
surrogate modeling may or may not be relevant, or even sufficient in some 
11 
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circumstances.3 Rather, the issue in this case is whether the decision-maker can ignore 
relevant evidence on the issue of whether or not the NAAQS for PM 2 j will actually be 
violated. The only actual modeling evidence of P M ^ ^ this record shows that the 
proposed facility would exceed the NAAQS for PM2^ in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
7475(a)(3). The ALJ refused to even consider that evidence, and that was error. While 
the surrogate approach permits consideration of PM I0 modeling evidence, it does not 
allow the ALJ to ignore other relevant evidence. 
The approach advocated by Respondents and adopted by the ALJ has no support 
in the law. Under that approach, the evidence could show conclusively that the PM2.s 
NAAQS would be violated by a proposed facility, but the ALJ would be constrained to 
"find" otherwise whenever the PM10 limit is.satisfied. In effect, that rationale would 
repeal the PM2.5 limit. Nothing in either the guidance or the recent EPA publication 
allows or requires that result. Ignoring relevant evidence is inconsistent with conducting 
a hearing and making findings. It is also inconsistent with the Act's provision that 
renders the permit illegal if the plant would cause the NAAQS for PM25 to be exceeded. 
The parties dispute certain specifics concerning the meaning of the EPA guidance, and whether 
that guidance is consistent with the Act itself. Neither guidance nor regulations, of course, can 
contradict the federal statute. Respondents also cite a recent Federal Register publication of a 
new EPA rule - which would appear to raise the earlier "guidance" to something like "role 
status" - although k appears that the new rule will not go into effect until after this Court's 
decision- Given this Court's ruling concerning the PM.2,5 issue, it need not resolve the nuances of 
the parties5 arguments concerning when the surrogate approach may satisfy the Act as a general 
matter in the absence of other evidence. 
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IV. INTEGRATED GASIFICATION COMBINED CYCLE 
Petitioners' final argument concerning BACT requirements involves an alternative 
^fiiel combustion technique/' The Longleaf plant as proposed would consume coal to 
generate electricity. Under Longleaf s proposed design, the coal would be burned in a 
boiler; the heat from the boiler would generate steam; and that steam would drive a 
turbine, which, in turn, would drive a generator to generate electricity. The IGCC 
technology (integrated gasification combined cycle) is a diffetent way of using the coal to 
generate heat to drive the turbines. 40 C.F.R. § 60,41 Da. IGCC works by first 
converting the coal to a gas ~ called "gasification" - and then burning the gas to drive 
turbines both directly from the hot gas and from steam, which again is created by the heat 
of combustion. And once again, the turbines drive the generator to create electricity. 
Respondents argue that they are not required by the BACT statute and regulations 
to do a full analysis of IGCC combustion technology, and that the permit limitations need 
not incorporate lower pollution Hmits thai would occur if IGCC were used. Longleaf 
advances this argument, which was accepted by the ALJ, by focusing not on the overall 
proposed plant, but on just one aspect of the facility. At the hearing, Longleaf argqed 
that the legal analysis here should focus only on the proposed toiler," not on the 
"facility," which is a much broader term. 
Respondents' approach is too narrow and cannot be squared with the provisions of 
the law that control the Court's decision on this issue. The BACT statute is explicit in 
this regard. It requires a BACT analysis and permit emission limitations based on the 
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"emitting facility" as a whole. 42 U.S-C § 7479(3). In addition, the statute was amended 
in 1977 to require, as part of the BACT analysis, consideration of "innovative fuel 
combustion techniques." IGCC is an "innovative fuel combustion technique." 
The proposed "major emitting facility* is still the same-kind of statutorily defined 
"facility" under the Clean Air Act whether the coal is burned directly in a boiler or is first 
converted to gas and then burned to create the heat of combustion that drives the turbines. 
The ALJ erred in ruling that IGCC would "redefine the air pollution source" so that it 
need not be part of the BACT analyses. (Final Decision, pp. 8-9). Under the statutory 
definition, ooe kind of "major emitting facility" is a "fossil-fuel fired steam electric 
plant" 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1), With or without IGCC technology, the Longleaf plant thus 
falls under the same "facility" definition - a "fossil-fiiel fired steam electric plant" The 
regulatory definition supports this conclusion. It provides: 
Integrated gasification combined cycle electric utility steam generating unit 
or IGCC electric utility steam generating unit means a coal-fired electric 
utility steam generating unit that burns a synthetic gas derived from coal in 
a combined-cycle gas turbine. 
40CF.R. §60.41.Da. 
While the statute and regulation are clear on their face, the Court would also note 
that the proponent of the 1977 amendment that added the BACT language at issue 
addressed this specific question on the Senate floor. In his explanation to the Senate 
concemmg the amendment Senator Huddleston explained that while he believed BACT 
already included "such technologies as ... gasification,*5 the amendment was added 
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nevertheless '"to be more explicit, to make sure there is no chance of misinterpretation/' 
123 Cong. Rec. S. 9434-35 (June 10, 1977), 
V. THE ALFS SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF COUNTS XIII AND XIV 
Petitioners next appeal from the ALTs summary dismissal of Counts XIII and 
XIV of their Amended Petition, which challenged as inadequate Longleafs assessment of 
the impact of known carcinogens and other toxic emissions on public health and its 
assessment of visibility impairments. First Amended Petition, fl[ 177,179, 194. The 
ALJ dismissed these claims without hearing evidence because the petition did not include 
an allegation of specific emissions limitations that should have been included in the final 
permit if the health and visibility studies had been performed appropriately. However, as 
alleged in detail and asserted in Petitioners' offer of proof based on the Affidavit of K. 
Tran, ^  22, an appropriate health impact assessment of a plant like Longleaf requires 
consideration of many factors, and only after such a study, could appropriate permit 
limits be determined. First Amended Petition, ^f 177,179. Petitioners5 complaint 
concerning the lack of visibility impact studies included a litany of specific omissions 
and inadequacies, and specific allegations concerning the appropriate studies that needed 
to be performed as a prerequisite to the issuance of a permit. Id. f j 181-83, 185-86, 189-
94. 
The ALJ's summary dismissal of these counts for failure to include specific permit 
limitations was erroneous as a matter of law. The basis of these counts was not the limits 
in the permits, but the failure of the applicant to assess the public harm prior to 
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establishing permit limitations. Under tie ALJ's approach, a person complaining about 
the failure of an applicant to perform an assessment would be required - as a prerequisite 
to challenging that failure - to folly perform the required studies and then determine 
emission levels that would properly protect the public. No rule of pleading can 
reasonably impose such a burden on a litigant. Where a petitioner alleges that the 
applicant completely failed to do appropriate studies, neither the applicant nor EPD can 
claim "harm" by having those allegations heard and determined simply because 
petitioners themselves did not first do the studies the respondents failed to do. If the 
DNR rule the ALJ relied upon can be construed and applied in this fashion, it is plainly 
not authorized by law. 
An aggrieved persons right to review EPD's decision is guaranteed by statute. 
G.CG.A. § 12-2-2(c)(2XA). To allow for important issues to be precluded by such 
pleading contrivances would violate both the spirit and letter of the law that grants 
citizens the right to meaningful review. In Georgia, there is a strong presumption of 
judicial review of administrative actions. Nix v. long Mountain Resources, Inc., 262 Ga. 
506,509 (1992)- Georgia is a liberal pleading state, and especially so in administrative 
proceedings. Schaefer v. Clark, 112 Ga. App. 806 (1965). Requiring a litigant to 
identify a precise permit limitation as a precondition to judicial review is contrary to 
these well-established pleading standards. Moreover, procedural questions arising at any 
stage of the proceeding which are not addressed in the Administrative Procedures Act or 
any other applicable law shall be resolved at the discretion of the ALJ, who may consult 
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and utilize the Civil Procedure Act and the Uniform Superior Court Rules in the exercise 
of this discretion. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs, 616-l-2-.02(3). 
EPD cites general statutory provisions in support of the ALJ's order, such as 
0,C.GA. § 50-13-3(a)(2)< That statute allows the department to adopt "rules of 
practice/' but nothing in it or any other statute authorizes the kind of rule the DNR relies 
on here. The Court of Appeals has addressed the sufficiency of pleadings under this 
statute, Georgia PSCv. Alltel Georgia Communications Corp., 244 Ga- App, 645, 648 
(2000), and that case demonstrates the error of the ALFs ruling. Alltel upheld the 
sufficiency of a notice feat was much less detailed than what was set forth in Counts XIII 
and XTV of the First Amended Petition here. Petitioners' pleadings were clearly 
sufficient 
VI- MOTION TO AMEND PETITION TO ADDRESS THE 
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING LICENSURE STATUS OF EPD 
PERSONNEL 
Finally, Petitioners challenge the permit because the underlying BACT analyses 
by the EPD were not performed by a professional engineer. The AIJ initially ruled that 
Petitioners were late in raising this challenge, but went on to rule against Petitioners on 
the merits regardless, holding that the absence of a professional engineer did not 
invalidate the permit. Since the AU determined the issue on the merits, this Court will 
do so as well. 
The scope of work that falls within "professional engineering" is specified by 
statute, O.C.G.A. § 43-15-2(11), and it includes the kind of work involved in the BACT 
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analyses here. The purpose of limiting such work to professional engineers is to 
"safeguard life, health, and property and to promote the public welfare." O.C.G A. § 43-
15-1. ^ There are some exceptions where peisons may perform engineering responsibilities 
where they are not a licensed professional engineer. O.C.GA. § 43-15-29. There is no 
such exemption, however, for employees of the EPD doing the kind of work involved in 
reviewing the permit at issue here. The Georgia Board of Engineers, which is charged 
with enforcing the professional engineering statutes, has ruled that determinations like 
those in BACT analyses constitute the practice of engineering. 
The parties have provided the Court with no direct authority as to whether an EPD 
permit should be invalidated if those persons who made engineering determinations were 
not in fact licensed engineers. By analogy, however, there is authority that requires the 
invalidation of certain actions taken in the absence of a licensed professional where one 
was required Courts have invalidated contracts where the party performing under the 
contract was not a licensed professional, but should have been, See, Food Management, 
Inc. v. Blue Ribbon Beef Pack Inc., 413 R2d 716,724-25 (8th Cir. 1969)(surveying 
decisions). In Georgia, the failure to comply with licensing requirements where they are 
imposed not just for revenue purposes, but for public protection, renders a contract void. 
Culverhouse v. Atlanta Association for Convalescent Aged Persons, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 
574,576-77(1972). 
It is important that BACT analyses be performed by competent individuals who 
are familiar with the technology. Otherwise, the permit limits may be wrong, 
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endangering public health. On remand the BPD must utilize sufficient engineering 
assistance and direction to ensure that all BACT determinations are done properly and 
professionally* 
CONCLUSION 
Based on this Court's review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the 
hearing of June 3, 2008, the final decision of the ALJ entered on January 11,2008 is 
hereby REVERSED insofar as it is inconsistent with the rulings of the Court herein, and 
it is VACATED in its entirety and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 
this Order, including a de novo determination of all facts and issues based upon the 
record that may ultimately be developed when the omissions and errors specified herein 
have been corrected. The ALPs Order on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and the 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment entered on 
November 27 and December 18, 2007, respectively, are hereby REVERSED. The ALJ's 
Order Denying Motion for Leave to Amend the Petition, for Leave to File a Motion for 
Summary Determination, and for Summary Determination Based on Newly-Discovered 
Evidence, entered on November 30,2007, is also REVERSED, 
So ORDERED this 
ELMA WYATT OJMMllSGS MOORE. JUDGE 
[/LTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 
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Summary of Inclusion of 
CO2 Requirements in Case 
Documents 
Complaint generally notes that Part 75 
requires continuous emissions 
monitoring systems (CEMs) for C02 
and other acid rain pollutants (ffl[3-5), 
states that 40 CFR §75.10(a)(3) 
contains the CO2 monitoring 
requirements (f 8), and lists specific 
C02 CEMs violations ( ^ 16-18) 
(See p. 3-15 of attached) 
Consent Agreement and Consent 
Order does not mention CO2, but does 
note IES's general compliance with 
CAA §412 (f 4) and the Acid Rain 
Deposition requirements of CAA Title 
iv a 5) 
(Seep. 16-21 of attached) 
Complaint generally notes the 
monitoring and reporting requirements 
of Sections 412 and 821 of the Act 
( \ 5), notes that Part 75 requires 
continuous emissions monitoring 
systems (CEMs) for C02 and other 
acid rain pollutants (1HJ3-4, 34), and 
alleges general violations of the Part 
75 monitoring and reporting 
requirements ( ffi[ 35-36, 45-46) 
(See p. 22-36 of attached) 
Consent Agreement and Final Order 
fl[ 2) alleges violations of Sections 412 
and 821 of the Act but does not 
specifically mention CO2 or any other 
Part 75 pollutant1 
(Seep. 37-46 of attached) 
EPA has been unable to locate a signed copy of the Consent Agreement and Final Order in 
Indiana Municipal Power Agency. Attached is an unsigned copy of the document, which was 
provided by the Regional Counsel assigned to the matter. 
Deseret Power Electric Cooperative, Exhibit 1 to 
PSD Appeal No 07-03 OAR and Region Vlll's Supplement Brief 
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CAA § 304 
EPA: CAA §§ 
304(c) and 
113(b) 
Summary of Inclusion of 
C02 Requirements in Case 
Documents 
Consent Agreement and Final Order 
generally states that the Acid Rain 
Program requirements of 40 C.F.R. 
Parts 72 to 78 require continuous 
emissions monitoring systems (CEMs) 
for CO2 and other acid rain pollutants 
(ff5-8) and lists general CEMs 
violations but does not specifically 
mention C02 or any other Part 75 
pollutant (H 31-35) 
(Seep. 47-61 of attached) 
Complaint generally states that CAA § 
412 and 40 C.F.R. Part 75 require 1 
CEMs for CO2 and other acid rain 
pollutants fl[ 29) and 
alleges a general violation of the Part 
75 CEMs requirements (^ [49) 
(See p. 62-80 of attached) 
Consent Decree restates claim 
regarding lack of CEMs for C02 
(1f 5) and requires installation of CEMs 
as required by Part 75 flf 25) 
(Seep. 81-118 of attached) 
Consent Decree fl[ 9) requires 
monitoring of CO2 emissions and other 
acid rain pollutants in full compliance 
with the requirements of Part 75 
(See p. 119-168 of attached) 
Sierra Club v. Public Service Company of Colorado was a CAA citizen suit in which EPA 
intervened. EPA identified this case on an archived administrative enforcement database, and a 
plain text copy of the consent decree was the only relevant document from this case that we 
could locate. 
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Site ID: 10355 
Title V Operating Permit 
PERMIT NUMBER: 3500068002 
DATE OF PERMIT: November 29, 2004 
Date of Last Revision: March 6, 2006 
This Operating Permit is issued to, and applies to the following: 
Name of Permittee: Permitted Location: 
PacifiCorp Gadsby Power Plant 
1407 W. North Temple 1407 West North Temple (rear) 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
UTM coordinates: 4,513,486 meters Northing, 421,582 meters Easting 
SIC code: 4911 
ABSTRACT 
The PacifiCorp Gadsby Power Plant is a natural gas-fired electric generating plant consisting of three 
steam boilers (Units #1, #2, and #3) and three combustion gas turbines (Units #4, 5, and #6). Unit #1 is a 
65 MW unit constructed in 1951, Unit #2 is an 80 MW unit constructed in 1952, and Unit #3 is a 105 
MW unit constructed in 1955. Fuel oil may be used in Units #1, #2, and #3 as a back-up fuel during 
natural gas curtailments. Units #1 and #2 are equipped with low NOx burners. Three 43.5 MW LM 6000 
natural gas-fueled simple cycle gas turbine engines (Units #4, #5, and #6) were added in 2002 and are 
subject to New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) Subparts A and GG. The plant is a PM]0 SIP 
source located in a PMi0 nonattainment area and an ozone maintenance area. The plant is also a Phase II 
Acid Rain source and a major source of NOx and CO. 
UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
By: Prepared By: 
Richard W. Sprott, Executive Secretary Jennifer He 
150 North 1950 West • PO Box 144820 • Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4820 • phone (801) 536-4000 • fax (801) 536-4099 
T.D.D. (801) 536-4414 • www.deq.utah.gov 
II.B.l.d Condition: 
Visible emissions from abrasive blasting operations shall not exceed 40% opacity, except 
for an aggregate period of three minutes in any one hour.. [Authority granted under 
R307-206; condition originated in R307-206] 
II.B.l.d.l Monitoring: 
Visible emission evaluation of abrasive blasting operations shall be conducted at 
least quarterly in accordance Provision I.S.I of this permit and the following 
provisions: 
(a) Visible emissions shall be measured using EPA Method 9. Visible emissions 
from intermittent sources shall use procedures similar to Method 9, but the 
requirement for observations to be made at 15 second intervals over a six-minute 
period shall not apply. 
(b) Visible emissions from unconfmed blasting shall be measured at the densest 
point of the emission after a major portion of the spent abrasive has fallen out, at 
a point not less than five feet nor more than twenty-five feet from the impact 
surface from any single abrasive blasting nozzle. 
(c) An unconfined blasting operation that uses multiple nozzles shall be 
considered a single source unless it can be demonstrated by the owner or operator 
that each nozzle, measured separately, meets the emission and performance 
standards provided in R307-206-2 through 4. 
(d) Visible emissions from confined blasting shall be measured at the densest 
point after the air contaminant leaves the enclosure. 
II.B. 1 d.2 Recordkeeping: 
Results of monitoring shall be maintained in accordance with Provision I.S.I of 
this permit. 
II.B.l.d.3 Reporting: 
There are no reporting requirements for this provision except*those specified in 
Section I of this permit. 
II.B.2 Conditions on Steam Generating Unit #1 (Emission unit #1) 
II.B.2.a Condition: 
Emissions of NOx shall be no greater than 179 lbs/hour and 336 ppmdv (3% 02, dry). 
[Authority granted under Utah SIP Section IX.H.2.b.BBB; condition originated in 
DAQE-204-02] 
ILB.2.a. 1 Monitoring: 
a. The permittee shall determine compliance with the NOx limits by calculating 
arithmetic average of three contiguous one-hour periods NOx emission rate 
(lb/hr) or concentration (ppmdv, 3% 02 dry) generated from paragraph b of this 
section. 
b. The permittee shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate continuous 
emission monitoring systems (CEMS) for NOx and C02 as required by 40 CFR 
Part 75 for the Acid Rain Program. The hourly average 02 concentration 
(percent by volume) shall be calculated from C02 concentration obtained from 
C02 CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The NOx 
concentration (ppm) obtained from NOx CEMS shall be corrected to 3% 02 on 
hourly basis using the 02 data calculated above. The emission rate (lb/hr) shall 
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be calculated by multiplying the hourly average NOx emission rate (lb/MMBtu) 
by the hourly heat input (MMBtu/hr). The hourly average NOx emission rate 
(lb/MMBTU) shall be calculated by using NOx and C02 concentrations obtained 
from CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The heat input 
shall be calculated by multiplying the measured fuel flow rate (scf/hr) by the 
hourly average C02 concentration (percent by volume) and by any necessary 
conversion factors in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. 
c. Each continuous emission monitoring system shall meet the Specifications 
and Test Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix A. 
d. The permittee shall implement Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix B. 
II.B.2.a.2 Recordkeeping: 
The permittee shall maintain a file of all measurements and calculations, 
including continuous monitoring system, monitoring device, and performance 
testing measurements; all continuous monitoring system performance 
evaluations; all continuous monitoring system or monitoring device calibration 
checks; adjustments and maintenance performed on these systems or devices 
recorded in a permanent form suitable for inspection. 
II.B.2.a.3 Reporting: 
The permittee shall comply with the reporting provisions in 40 CFR 75 Subpart 
G, and all the reporting provisions contained in Section I of this permit. 
II.B.3 Conditions on Steam Generating Unit #2 (Emission unit #2) 
II.B.3.a Condition: 
Emissions of NOx shall be no greater than 204 lbs/hour and 336 ppmdv (3% 02, dry). 
[Authority granted under Utah SIP Section IX.H.2.b.BBB; condition originated in 
DAQE-204-02] 
II.B.3. a.l Monitoring: 
a. The permittee shall determine compliance with the NOx limits by calculating 
arithmetic average of three contiguous one-hour periods NOx emission rate 
(lb/hr) or concentration (ppmdv, 3% 02 dry) generated from paragraph b of this 
section. 
b. The permittee shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate continuous 
emission monitoring systems (CEMS) for NOx and C02 as required by 40 CFR 
Part 75 for the Acid Rain Program. The hourly average 02 concentration 
(percent by volume) shall be calculated from C02 concentration obtained from 
C02 CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The NOx 
concentration (ppm) obtained from NOx CEMS shall be corrected to 3% 02 on 
hourly basis using the 02 data calculated above. The emission rate (lb/hr) shall 
be calculated by multiplying the hourly average NOx emission rate (lb/MMBtu) 
by the hourly heat input (MMBtu/hr). The hourly average NOx emission rate 
(lb/MMBTU) shall be calculated by using NOx and C02 concentrations obtained 
from CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The heat input 
shall be calculated by multiplying the measured fuel flow rate (scf/hr) by the 
hourly average C02 concentration (percent by volume) and by any necessary 
conversion factors in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. 
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c. Each continuous emission monitoring system shall meet the Specifications 
and Test Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix A. 
d. The permittee shall implement Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix B. 
II.B.3.a.2 Recordkeeping: 
The permittee shall maintain a file of all measurements and calculations, 
including continuous monitoring system, monitoring device,.and performance 
testing measurements; all continuous monitoring system performance 
evaluations; all continuous monitoring system or monitoring device calibration 
checks; adjustments and maintenance performed on these systems or devices 
recorded in a permanent form suitable for inspection. 
II.B.3.a.3 Reporting: 
The permittee shall comply with the reporting provisions in 40 CFR 75 Subpart 
G, and all the reporting provisions contained in Section I of this permit. 
II.B.4 Conditions on Steam Generating Unit #3 (Emission unit #3) 
II.B.4.a Condition: 
Emissions of NOx shall be no greater than 142 lbs/hour and 168 ppmdv (3% 02, dry) 
from November 1 through February 28 (29). Emissions of NOx shall be no greater than 
203 lbs/hour and 168 ppmdv (3% 02, dry) from March 1 through October 31. [Authority 
granted under Utah SIP IX.H.2.b.BBB; condition originated in DAQE-204-02] 
II.B.4.a. 1 Monitoring: 
a. The permittee shall determine compliance with the NOx limits by calculating 
arithmetic average of three contiguous one-hour periods NOx emission rate 
(lb/hr) or concentration (ppmdv, 3% 02 dry) generated from paragraph b of this 
section. 
b. The permittee shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate continuous 
emission monitoring systems (CEMS) for NOx and C02 as required by 40 CFR 
Part 75 for the Acid Rain Program. The hourly average 02 concentration 
(percent by volume) shall be calculated from C02 concentration obtained from 
C02 CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The NOx 
concentration (ppm) obtained from NOx CEMS shall be corrected to 3% 02 on 
hourly basis using the 02 data calculated above. The emission rate (lb/hr) shall 
be calculated by multiplying the hourly average NOx emission rate (lb/MMBtu) 
by the hourly heat input (MMBtu/hr). The hourly average NOx emission rate 
(lb/MMBTU) shall be calculated by using NOx and CO? concentrations obtained 
from CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The heat input 
shall be calculated by multiplying the measured fuel flow rate (scf/hr) by the 
hourly average C02 concentration (percent by volume) and by any necessary 
conversion factors in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. 
c. Each continuous emission monitoring system shall meet the Specifications 
and Test Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix A. 
d. The permittee shall implement Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix B. 
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characteristics, to the emissions unit undergoing BACT review. 
IV.A.l. DEMONSTRATED AND TRANSFERABLE TECHNOLOGIES 
Applicants are expected to identify all demonstrated and potentially 
applicable control technology alternatives. Information sources to consider 
include: 
• EPA's BACT/LAER Clearinghouse and Control Technology Center; 
• Best Available Control Technology Guideline - South Coast Air Quality 
Management District; 
• control technology vendors; 
• Federal/State/Local new source review permits and associated 
inspection/performance test reports; 
• environmental consultants; 
• technical journals, reports and newsletters (e.g., JAPCA and the 
Mclvaine reports), air pollution control seminars; and 
• EPA's New Source Review (NSR) bulletin board. 
The applicant should make a good faith effort to compile appropriate 
information from available information sources, including any sources 
specified as necessary by the permit agency. The permit agency should review 
the background search and resulting list of control alternatives presented by 
the applicant to check that it is complete and comprehensive. 
In identifying control technologies, the applicant needs to survey the 
range of potentially available control options. Opportunities for technology 
transfer lie where a control technology has been applied at source categories 
other than the source under consideration. Such opportunities should be 
identified. Also, technologies in application outside the United States to 
the extent that the technologies have been successfully demonstrated in 
practice on full scale operations. Technologies which have not yet been 
applied to (or permitted for) full scale operations need not be considered 
available; an applicant should be able to purchase or construct a process or 
control device that has already been demonstrated in practice. 
B.ll 
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Utah State Implementation Plan 
Section VIII 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, Congress added language to the Clean Air Act to prevent significant deterioration of air quality 
in areas where the air quality was still pristine. The Act placed a special emphasis on protection of the 
nation's national parks and wilderness areas where pristine air is one of the important attributes for 
visitors to the area. Areas are designated according to the degree of protection that is needed, and a 
baseline pollution level is established. The Act then allows the air quality to degrade only a specified 
amount from this baseline level. 
1. Utah's PSD Program. 
The State of Utah developed rules and revised the State Implementation Plan to implement the Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program as required by the 1977 Clean Air Act (CAA). EPA 
approved Utah's PSD program on February 12, 1982. PSD applies to all areas of the State except those 
designated as nonattainment under Section 107 of the CAA. PSD permitting requirements apply to all air 
pollutants regulated under the CAA. Deterioration of air quality must only be tracked for PMJO, N02 and 
S02. If an area is designated nonattainment for an air pollutant, PSD may still apply for all other 
pollutants. 
2. Nitrogen Dioxide Increments. 
On October 17, 1988, EPA promulgated PSD increments for nitrogen dioxide. Utah incorporated the new 
increments into the PSD program. These increments apply to all areas within the state designated as 
attainment or unclassifiable for nitrogen dioxide under Section 107 of the federal CAA. 
3. PMio Increments. 
On November 3, 1995 EPA approved a revision to Utah's PSD program to replace the total suspended 
particulate (TSP) increment with a PMi0 increment. 
4. WEPCO Revisions. 
On August 19, 2004 EPA approved changes to Utah's PSD program to reflect changes in the federal 
regulations (commonly referred to as the WEPCO rule). The changes affected how applicability is 
determined for electric utility generating units. 
5. NSR Reform. 
On December 31, 2002 the Environmental Protection Agency finalized significant changes to the federal 
PSD new source review regulations (this major rulemaking effort is commonly referred to as NSR 
reform). These regulations were the subject of numerous challenges, and in 2005 the DC Circuit Court 
vacated portions of the NSR reform regulations. In addition, revisions to the NSR Reform regulations to 
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clarify the routine maintenance, repair and replacement (RMRR) provisions were promulgated in 2003, 
but then stayed by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals on December 23, 2003, pending appeal. Utah's PSD 
permitting rule, R307-405, was modified in February 2006 to incorporate the 2002 NSR reform 
provisions. The RMRR provisions and the portions of the PSD regulation that were vacated by the DC 
Circuit Court were not included in this incorporation pending resolution of the challenges to the 
regulation. 
B. AREA DESIGNATIONS 
All attainment and unclassifiable areas in the state must be designated as Class I, Class II or Class III. 
These designations are intended to establish the amount of air quality degradation that is acceptable for 
these areas. Nonattainment areas are not covered under the PSD requirements, but in most cases an area 
will only be nonattainment for a few pollutants. In this case, the PSD requirements will still apply for all 
other pollutants. R307-405-4 classifies all areas in Utah. These areas are identified below. 
1. Class I Areas 
As required by the Clean Air Act, the five national parks that were in existence in Utah in 1977 are 
mandatory Class I areas. 
Arches National Park 
Bryce Canyon National Park 
Canyonlands National Park 
Capitol Reef National Park 
Zion National Park 
Class I areas are given the greatest degree of protection under the Clean Air Act. In addition, these areas 
are the focus for visibility concerns, as outlined in Section XVII of this State Implementation Plan. 
2. Class II Areas 
All other areas in the state are currently classified as Class II areas. Industrial growth is allowed in these 
areas, but in many parts of the state where the air is exceptionally clean, the air quality will not be 
allowed to degrade to the level of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 
3. Class III Areas 
The remaining designation of Class III could be used for more industrial areas. Greater growth is allowed 
in these areas, although in all cases the National Ambient Air Quality Standards must still be met. There 
are currently no areas in Utah that have been designated Class III. 
C. AREA REDESIGNATIONS 
The State of Utah may change the classification of areas within the state. However, there are some 
limitations in the Clean Air Act that must be considered when reclassifying areas. 
Section VIII, page 2 
1. Restrictions on Redesignation. 
a. In accordance with Section 162(a) of the federal Clean Air Act, mandatory Class I areas may 
not be redesignated. There are five mandatory Class 1 areas in Utah: Arches National Park, 
Bryce Canyon National Park, Canyonlands National Park, Capitol Reef National Park, and Zion 
National Park. 
b. In accordance with Section 164(a) of the federal Clean Air Act, the following areas may be 
redesignated only as Class I or II. 
(1) An area which as of August 7, 1977, exceeded 10,000 acres in size and was a national 
monument, a national primitive area, a national preserve, a national recreation area, a national 
wild and scenic river, a national wildlife refuge, a national lakeshore or seashore; and 
(2) A national park or national wilderness area established after August 7, 1977, which 
exceeds 10,000 acres in size. 
c. Lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations of federally recognized Indian Tribes may 
be redesignated only by the appropriate Indian body as provided in Section 164 of the Clean Air 
Act. 
2. Analysis of Proposal. 
Before proposing a change in classification, Section 164 of the federal Clean Air Act requires the State to 
prepare information about the proposal. The executive secretary will prepare a discussion of the reasons 
for the proposed redesignation, including a satisfactory description and analysis of the health, 
environmental, economic and social and energy effects of the proposed redesignation. Any person who 
petitions the Board for redesignation of an area is required to prepare and submit this analysis to the 
Board in accordance with R307-405-5. 
Before proposing to redesignate an area to Class III, the following additional information is required: 
a. documentation that the redesignation will not cause, or contribute to, concentrations of any air 
pollutant which would exceed any maximum allowable increase permitted under the classification 
of any other area or any national ambient air quality standard; and 
b. the permit application for any major source or major modification (as defined in R307-405) 
that could receive a PSD permit only if the area in question were redesignated as Class III, and 
any material submitted as part of that application, insofar as practicable. 
3. Consultation with Local Governments 
Before the Board proposes the redesignation of any area, the executive secretary will consult with the 
elected leadership of local and other substate general purpose governments in the area covered by the 
proposed redesignation. 
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4. Public Comment 
The Board will provide an opportunity for public comment on the proposed reclassification and 
supporting documentation. 
a. Notice will be published in newspapers of general circulation in the affected area and written 
notice will be made to local government units, other states, Indian governing bodies and Federal 
Land Managers whose lands may be affected by the proposed redesignation. Such notice will be 
made at least 30 days prior to the public hearing and include a statement of the availability of the 
information described in Section C.3 above. 
b. At least one public hearing will be conducted in the affected areas in accordance with the 
procedures established in 40 CFR 51.102. 
c. Prior to the issuance of notice respecting the redesignation of any Federal lands, written notice 
will be provided to the appropriate Federal Land Manager who will be afforded adequate 
opportunity (not in excess of 60 days) to confer with the State respecting the redesignation and to 
submit written comments and recommendations. In recommending redesignation of any area 
with respect to which a Federal Land Manager has submitted comments, the Board will publish a 
list of any inconsistency between such redesignation and such comments and recommendations 
(together with the reasons for recommending such redesignation against the recommendation of 
the Federal Land Manager). 
5. Additional Requirements for Redesignating Areas to Class III 
If the Board is proposing to redesignate an area of the state to Class III, section 164 of the Clean Air Act 
requires additional consultation and approval. The State of Utah will ensure that the following actions 
have occurred before redesignating any area to Class III. 
a. The proposed redesignation has been specifically approved by the Governor after consultation 
with appropriate committees of the Legislature, if it is in session, or with the leadership of the 
Legislature, if it is not in session. 
b. Units of local government representing a majority of the residents of the proposed area to be 
redesignated have enacted ordinances concurring in the redesignation. 
6. Submittal 
The State of Utah will submit the redesignation to the EPA Administrator as a revision to the State 
Implementation Plan. 
D. PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW AND 
MODIFIED SOURCES 
R307-405 establishes the permitting requirements for new major sources or major modifications in 
attainment or unclassified areas of the state as required by 40 CFR 51.166. 
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1. Impact Analysis 
An applicant for a PSD permit is required to conduct an air quality analysis of the ambient impacts 
associated with the construction and operation of the proposed new source or modification. The main 
purpose of the air quality analysis is to demonstrate that new emissions emitted from a proposed major 
stationary source or major modification, in conjunction with other applicable emissions from existing 
sources (including secondary emissions from growth associated with the new project), will not cause or 
contribute to a violation of any national ambient air quality standard or PSD increment. Ambient air 
monitoring may be required before and after construction of the source to ensure that the modeled results 
are accurate. 
2. Best Available Control Technology 
Utah's PSD program requires all new major sources and major modifications in PSD areas to use the best 
available control technology that would yield the highest air cleaning efficiencies and the lowest pollution 
discharges. Over time, it is expected that older sources will upgrade their operations to become more 
efficient and competitive in the marketplace and under the PSD program these sources are also required to 
upgrade their pollution controls as part of the modification. The program has been successful in Utah, 
and the number of sources considered "grandfathered" and operating under pre-1977 emission limitations 
continues to decrease. 
3. Additional Impact Analysis 
The air quality impact assessment of PSD sources goes beyond measuring the impact of new sources on 
the NAAQS and PSD increment. The permit applicant must prepare additional impact analyses to assess 
the impacts of air, ground, and water pollution on soils, vegetation and visibility caused by the new 
source and any associated growth. Class I areas require additional scrutiny to ensure that the air quality 
related values that are important to each protected area are not adversely affected by the new source. 
4. Minor Source Permitting Program 
In addition to the PSD permitting program, Utah also requires new minor sources and minor 
modifications to all sources to apply best available control technology. R307-410 establishes modeling 
requirements to ensure that minor sources and modifications will not cause or contribute to a violation of 
the NAAQS. 
E. Increment Violations 
Where the Board determines that an increment established under R307-405-6 is violated, the Board will 
promulgate a plan and implement rules to eliminate the violation 
F. Emission Inventories for Increment Tracking. 
An initial emissions inventory tracking system for increment consumption has been developed for 
existing major sources approved since the minor source baseline dates were established. The tracking 
system will be maintained for all pollutants having increments. 
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